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It has been traditionally believed that humans, who exhibit well-studied behav-
iors and statistical regularities in their traffic, primarily generate the stream of
traffic seen by Web servers. Over the past decade, however, the Web has seen a
drastic increase in the number of requests initiated by contemporary Web robots
or crawlers. These robots, whose traffic can be significant (upwards of 45% on
the UConn School of Engineering Web server and 70% across digital libraries),
exhibit sophisticated functionality and have widely varying demands. To prepare
Web servers to handle this new generation of traffic with high performance, to
develop methods that control and limit their behavior, and to understand how
they interact with the social and sensitive data shared on the Web, a deep un-
derstanding of Web robots and their traffic qualities is essential. Unfortunately,
the current understanding of robot traffic and their impact on the performance
of a Web server is minimal. This deficiency is compounded by the fact that: (i)
state-of-the-art methods for identifying their visits are very limited; and (ii) owing
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to the fundamental behavioral differences between robots and humans, we cannot
assume that our knowledge of human behavior and traffic features transcend to
robots. This dissertation addresses the above deficiencies and carries out a com-
prehensive evaluation of Web robot traffic on the Internet. We first introduce and
demonstrate the effectiveness of a new approach for detecting robot traffic that
is rooted in fundamental differences between robot and human behavior, and can
run offline or in real-time. Secondly, we propose a multi-dimensional classification
scheme to decompose robots based on their functionality, resource favoritism, and
workload demands. Thirdly, using traces of requests to Web servers across many
Internet domains, we reveal critical differences in the way robot and human traf-
fic qualities do (not) exhibit power-tailed trends and long-range dependence in
their arrival processes using a suite of analysis tools. Finally, we propose a novel
predictive caching algorithm that can service Web robot and human traffic si-
multaneously and with much higher performance compared to caching algorithms
that are used in practice.
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Chapter 1
Introduction and Motivation
A Web robot may be generally defined as an autonomous program that sends re-
quests to servers across the Internet requesting some resources. The program then
analyzes the results received, or sends the results to a central agency, to extract
knowledge from the collected data to fulfill some specific purpose in a broader
context. A canonical example of a Web robot is a search engine indexer, while a
less common example is an RSS feed crawler or a robot designed to collect Web
sites for an Internet archive. Over the past decade, the proportion of http traffic
that can be attributed to these robots have risen at a staggering rate [86,94,35,60].
Whereas studies at the turn of the century identified approximately one out of
ten requests to be generated by Web robots [86,94], recent measurements find
that robot traffic constitutes at least half of all the traffic seen by academic, e-
commerce, testing, and vertical search engine sites [109].
This rapid rise in Web robot traffic may be attributed to the proliferation
of online social media services which promote user-generated content that has
lead to a dramatic increase in the volume of time-sensitive, dynamic information
1
2posted to the Web. Many organizations perceive value in such user-generated
content because it provides significant insights into users’ opinions about products,
services, and their emotions and reactions to current events [59]. posted to the
Internet. As a result, to keep data repositories up-to-date, contemporary Web
robots need to be more comprehensive in their searches, more specialized in their
functionality (to analyze a wider variety of data) [31,33], more frequent in their
visits (to stay abreast on content that changes dynamically and rapidly) [60,30],
and employ advanced algorithms for comprehensive crawls [5,97]. For example,
modern Web robots are capable of crawling news, social networking sites, and
user blogs to harvest emotional thoughts and feelings [68].
Presently, robots can crawl Web servers in an unregulated and wild man-
ner. They may behave unethically by ignoring the conditions imposed by ad-
ministrators in the file robots.txt [75]. They can also violate the privacy of users
by collecting their personal information posted on Web sites [45]. Organizations
may also be tempted to employ aggressive robots with questionable behaviors
for harvesting personal data that users innocently share via popular, public on-
line social network and social media services. This unrestricted behavior may
not only compromise user privacy, but may also impose onerous demands on
Web servers [32]. Furthermore, because robot traffic differs statistically from con-
ventional Web traffic [38,35], many Web server optimizations may not perform
adequately, and further drag down server performance.
3The properties of Web traffic have been studied extensively over the past
two decades [7,57,77]. These studies were based on Web access logs that primarily
consisted of requests from humans. Intuitively, however, the autonomous way in
which Web robots send requests to retrieve information off a site stands in sharp
contrast to the way humans browse a Web site. For example, a robot may send
requests at a constant request rate to retrieve all the resources at a site, and
then perform the processing to extract knowledge after the fact. Human-induced
traffic, however, is much more deliberate. A human commonly visits a site with
the goal of finding specific knowledge, and then analyzes the structure and data
on the existing pages to help find the information desired. Furthermore, the traffic
properties of humans are also induced by the characteristics of a Web browser.
For example, Web browsers may quickly send requests for all embedded resources
on a html page causing human traffic to be bursty. Due to these differences, our
current body of knowledge about Web traffic may not transcend to Web robots.
Although a small number of previous studies have attempted to better our
understanding of Web robot traffic, they are inadequate for three important rea-
sons. First, state-of-the-art Web robot detection techniques are unable to identify
contemporary robots that exhibit many different functionalities, and whose be-
havior evolves over time [36]. Second, existing studies about robot traffic do not
consider the varying behavior, functionality, or favored resources of individual
robots, even though evidence suggests that different robots exhibit very different
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Fig. 1.1: Relationship among the studies in this dissertation
qualities [31]. Finally, existing characterization studies only provide summary in-
formation about robot traffic, including average bytes transferred, total number
of requests, and the size of http responses [30,63].
The objective of this dissertation is to perform a comprehensive evaluation
of Web robot traffic on the Internet, which we carry out in four studies outlined
in Figure 1.1. In the first step, we enable a comprehensive evaluation by devel-
oping algorithms that can detect Web robot traffic within both Web server logs
and within real-time streams of Web traffic. In the second step, we propose a
multi-dimensional classification scheme for Web robot traffic, dividing their traf-
fic according to their intended functionality, traffic characteristics, and types of
resources they request during their sessions. Through the lens of this multi-
dimensional view, we identify patterns and behaviors that differentiate the many
types of Web robots that crawl the Web. In the third step, we introduce new
5tools for performing detailed analysis of heavy- and power-tailed features of Web
traffic, and apply them to robot sessions. Through this application, we identify
extremely important statistical contrasts between Web robot and human requests.
These contrsts have serious implications on the performance of Web servers that
are optimized to handle specific statistical trends in its stream of requests. In
the final step of our evaluation, we integrate the lessons learned from the previ-
ous three steps to develop a novel predictive caching scheme that can alleviate a
significant amount of the strain that robot requests impose on a Web server.
The dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 offers a detailed survey of
past Web robot detection algorithms and, identifies their limitations, and proposes
state-of-the-art methods for offline and real-time detection. Chapter 3 introduces
a multi-dimensional scheme for Web robot traffic, used to identify new patterns in
Web robot behavior. Chapter 4 assess whether or not important features of Web
robot traffic take on heavy- or power-tailed distributions across three different
Web servers from different domains of the Internet, and discusses how these dis-
tributions differ between robots and humans. Chapter 5 combines our offline and
real-time robot detection method and our findings from our classification scheme
and traffic study to develop a new predictive caching architecture and policy to
service robot and human traffic. We find that our approach outperforms a suite
of baseline methods by a large margin. Chapter 6 summarizes the contributions
of this dissertation and gives avenues for future work.
Chapter 2
Web Robot Detection
A prerequisite for any study about robot traffic is a mechanism that can reliably
identify Web robot sessions. This robot detection typically occurs during an offline
or post-mortem analysis of Web server access logs. Offline detection is necessary to
develop a deep understanding of how robots crawl, their traffic characteristics, and
functionality. Post-mortem analysis can also be used to enhance server security
by discovering resources that robots favor and where these are being sent based
on an IP address or user-agent look up service [110]. This analysis can thus
suggest whether a Web site may benefit from more secure or strict data publication
policies and access control methods. Offline detection, however, can only identify
robots in retrospect or after-the-fact. While retrospective detection can be used
to guide the development of proactive strategies to limit the damage caused by
unethical or offensive robots, it does not offer Web servers the ability to distinguish
between active robot and human sessions. Instead, distinguishing between robot
and human sessions in real-time is necessary to limit the impact of robot traffic
on a Web server, by providing them differentiated treatment depending on their
6
7behaviors and on the present server conditions. For example, when a Web server
is under heavy load, robot requests can be handled with a lower priority. Robot
traffic may also be redirected to specialized caches [105] so as to not disrupt
resources in ones tailored for human traffic. Administrators may also deny robots’
requests for specific types of files; for example pdf or doc files on corporate Web
servers, out of concern that other organizations may be using these agents to
harvest critical information. As another example, robot sessions that successfully
enter secure areas of an online journal or a news site can be curtailed before
they begin to collect any premium, pay-to-access content. It is thus clear that
offline and online detection, each offer distinct, unique advantages, and hence,
both these approaches must be employed synergistically to protect Web servers
from ill-behaved, malicious robots.
In the early approaches to discover robots from Web logs, the user-agent
field of each http request in the logs was compared against a database of regular
expressions. The contents of this database, however, cannot be updated at the
same pace as the rapid growth in the novelty and sophistication of Web robots.
As a result, referencing a static database can only be useful in detecting old and
common Web robots. Thus, while this method may be simple to implement and
sufficient to detect common robots, it may not be as effective in detecting new
and evolving robots. A limited number of research efforts over the past decade
have refined these simple detection approaches, enriching the ability to detect
8a broader range of robots. These techniques vary widely in their underpinning
detection philosophy. For example, some consider different fields in the Web log
or identify simple patterns in sessions, while others perform a statistical analysis
across different features of Web robot traffic or use machine learning models for
detection. Some techniques even implement an entire system to detect robots in
real time, rather than by mining features in the Web server access logs. While each
of these techniques has been effective in its limited experimental demonstration,
their critical comparison either via experimentation or by a reasoning of their
features and capabilities is lacking. We argue that in order to develop robust
robot detection approaches that will continue to remain effective as the robot
traffic evolves, it is first necessary to understand these contemporary techniques
and identify their strengths, weaknesses, and differences.
In this chapter, we survey the existing approaches to detect Web robots
and propose a classification scheme that categorizes the contemporary detection
techniques in Section 2.1. The intention of our classification scheme is to exploit
the commonalities across the different techniques, highlight their differences, and
evaluate the ‘types’ of techniques that will be most effective for detecting modern
Web robot traffic. Based on this comparative analysis, Section 2.2 introduces
a new, integrated method that supports both offline and real-time Web robot
detection. Our detection approach relies on the training of analytical models over
the request patterns of robots and humans for different types of resources. We
9motivate why the resource request patterns of robots and humans are intrinsic
to their respective behaviors, and hence, are fundamentally distinct from each
other. We also describe how the contrasts in these request patterns are likely to
be immutable and persistent, even if robots and humans change their behaviors
over time. We evaluate the performance of our methodology for both offline and
real-time detection by playing back multiple streams of robot and human sessions
collected from the University of Connecticut (UConn) School of Engineering (SoE)
Web server. The results indicate that our approach can separate robots from
humans with high accuracy for varying session lengths and proportions of robot
traffic. Our approach thus offers two key advantages over contemporary detection
techniques, namely, it: (i) defines a model based on a fundamental, time-invariant
difference between robot and human behavior; and (ii) can be simultaneously used
for highly accurate offline and real-time detection1.
2.1 Survey and Analysis of Contemporary Techniques
We define the problem of identifying robot traffic on a server as the Web robot
detection problem, and formalize it as follows: Given a set of http request records
R, for each record r ∈ R classify r with a label specifying whether the request
was sent by a human user or sent by some automated program or a system.
Examples of such programs or systems include Web site indexers, spambots, and
1Portions of this chapter were previously written and published by the author in [36,34].
10
utility programs that scan Web sites for security vulnerabilities. Each r follows
a format defined by the Web server administrator, depending on how verbose or
simple they wish the server access log to be. Traditionally, r consists of at least
the address from which the request originated, the location and the name of the
resource requested, the http response code (i.e., 404 if the file is not found on the
server), and the user-agent field from the request packet.
Many proposed solutions to the robot detection problem classify sessions
rather than individual records. A session S ⊆ R is a collection of all request
records from a user during a single visit. In this case, the label assigned to S is
assigned to each r ∈ S implicity, so that all r ∈ R are classified. For techniques
that characterize sessions instead of individual requests, it is also necessary to
identify such sessions from the collection of records. We formalize the session
identification problem as follows: Given a set of http records R, find the set of
sessions S = {S1, ...,Sn} such that the sessions of S are mutually exclusive and⋃n
i=1 Si = R.
Such real-time detection techniques do not operate over Web server logs,
making the above problem formulation inappropriate for these techniques. They
instead solve a variant called the real-time robot detection problem, which we
formulate as follows: given a set of active sessions on a Web server SA, determine
whether the traffic in each session S ∈ SA is produced by a human or by a robot
before the session S is terminated. This variant analyzes an incoming stream of
11
requests to determine in real time whether an active session is human or robot-
induced. Naturally, real-time robot detection is more difficult than detection based
on server access logs as the data used for detection is limited only to observations
from the current session.
The real-time robot detection problem may be thought of as a combina-
tion of both intrusion prevention and intrusion detection problems. These are
related approaches that attempt to prevent unauthorized users from accessing a
given system (the prevention problem) or detecting that unauthorized users are
currently using the system (the detection problem). The main advantage of real-
time robot detection is that it makes it possible to impose immediate restrictions
on the robots’ access to site resources. Such restrictions might involve blocking
the robots, preventing them from accessing specific resources, or servicing their
requests with low priority compared to human sessions when the server is un-
der excessive load. The margin of error in real-time detection must be very low,
however, to minimize the risk of alienating a human because of an incorrect classi-
fication and the subsequent imposition of restrictions. Real-time robot detection
is a hybrid of both intrusion prevention and detection aimed specifically at Web
robots, where their visits may be detected before or during an active crawl of the
site.
Solutions to each of the above robot detection problems are important in
different contexts. Real-time detection is most important when the security of a
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site is of paramount concern. As already alluded to, sensing what active sessions
are from robots can help halt these robots from continuing to browse a site and
from accessing sensitive materials. In addition, real-time detection could be used
to block robot attacks by terminating their sessions before a server-side exploit
or DDoS attack causes any damage. Solutions to the offline detection problem
are useful to filter robot traffic for a characterization study that considers only
humans or vice versa.
2.1.1 Hierarchical classification
We classify the existing robot detection techniques into four categories, accord-
ing to their underpinning analysis or detection philosophy. We first describe the
four categories and then summarize the techniques belonging to each one of them.
The first three categories include techniques that solve the offline detection prob-
lem, while the fourth category is comprised of techniques that solve the real-time
detection problem. The categories are presented in the order of their detection
“strength”. We define the strength of a detection category as its potential to
detect previously unknown but well-behaved robots or sophisticated robots de-
signed to evade detection. In practice, the selection of a specific type of technique
used should balance the complexity and feasibility of its implementation against
protecting the security of the site. For example, if the goal of detection is to
extract a sample of Web robots from a Web log or to filter common, high-demand
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search engine Web robots such as Googlebot or MSNBot from an access log before
running usage reports, a weak detection technique that is simple to implement
may be appropriate. If the goal of detection, however, is to block robots that
mask their visits, or to identify specific types of robots that may pose a security
risk to a site, a stronger technique may be suitable. The four types of Web robot
detection techniques are as follows:
• Syntactical log analysis: Syntactical log analysis techniques attempt to
discover robots through a simple processing of access logs. This processing
involves looking for keywords in user-agent fields of robot requests or review-
ing the host addresses to identify locations from where robots are known to
originate. Some of the earlier detection techniques were based on syntactical
log analysis of server access files. The primary appeal of these techniques
lies in the simplicity of their implementation and their reliance on a read-
ily available file. Unfortunately, such techniques can only find those robots
that are previously known, because they are based on a prior knowledge of
specific key words and addresses from which robots originate.
• Traffic pattern analysis: Traffic-based analysis techniques seek to find
common characteristics of Web robot traffic that contrast with the features
of human traffic. For example, a traffic analysis technique may rely on
discovering conventional robot navigational patterns that involve a DFS or
a BFS search of all embedded links and resources from a main, home, or
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an index page of a Web site. Another technique may analyze the types
of resources that robots request to discover patterns indicative of robot
behavior, or consider the statistical contrasts between robot inter-arrival
times or session length distributions with those of a human visitor. The
key feature of traffic pattern analysis techniques is that they attempt to
detect robots based on fixed expectations about their behavior rather than
using the knowledge of their names and origins as in the case of syntactical
processing techniques. Thus, we consider traffic analysis based detection as
stronger than detection based on syntactical log analysis.
• Analytical learning techniques: The random nature of robot visits and
Web server traffic naturally lead to formal probabilistic models as a way to
detect robots. These techniques exploit the observed characteristics of the
logged sessions to estimate the likelihood that a given session was generated
by a robot using a formal machine learning or a probabilistic model. The
sessions may be characterized using several metrics such as time between
requests, session length, html-to-image request ratio, and percentage of re-
quests made using the http HEAD command. Analytical learning techniques
can also be retrained over time as the statistical trends in Web robot traffic
evolve. Thus, we consider analytical learning techniques to be even stronger
than detection based on traffic pattern analysis. The primary disadvantage
of analytical learning techniques, however, is that they require a training
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data set that includes robots that are difficult to detect in order to ensure
reasonable detection accuracy.
• Turing test systems: Analogous to how a Turing test tries to reliably
classify a conversation as being produced by a computer or a human in real
time [116], the robot detection problem tries to determine if server sessions
are being produced by a robot or a human, where the http request/response
pairs within a session is like a dialogue. We classify a technique that issues a
test to active sessions, analyzes the response, and then classifies the session
based on the results as a Turing test system. Such systems are designed to
perform real-time Web robot detection, a type of intrusion detection prob-
lem. These tests may either present a CAPTCHA [3] challenge to the visitor
or engineer Web sites such that the occurrence or non occurrence of a certain
event can help to determine whether the session passes or fails the Turing
test. While these techniques have a theoretical and algorithmic underpin-
ning, they are best recognized by their use of creative engineering techniques
to force active sessions to take the Turing test. In the context of Web robot
detection, active sessions that fail the Turing test can immediately be clas-
sified as Web robots.
Figure 2.1 visualizes our classification scheme for Web robot detection tech-
niques. As previously discussed, the techniques may be first classified according
to whether they perform offline or online detection. Online detection techniques
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Fig. 2.1: Web robot detection methods hierarchy
are labeled as Turing test systems. Offline detection techniques may be further
refined into syntactical log analysis, traffic pattern analysis, and analytical learn-
ing models. The nested structure in Figure 2.1 reflects the increasing strength of
each type of technique in the offline detection category. Techniques that fall into
a nested classification are more limited in the types of Web robots that they may
detect. Table 1 summarizes the major techniques that belong to each category
that this survey covers. Next, we discuss each of these techniques in detail.
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2.1.2 Syntactic log analysis
Syntactic log processing techniques analyze each entry in the server access log
based on the information recorded in the log. The first technique in this category
considers only individual fields in the logged request. The second technique ref-
erences a database of known robot user-agent fields, and subsequently compares
each request against this database. The final technique identifies robots based on
multiple facets recorded in a Web server log.
Detection through individual field parsing
The most simple syntactic detection techniques commonly used in many commer-
cial and open-source systems, such as AWStats [9], rely on comparing individual
fields of each request against a database or a list of keywords that indicate that
the request originates from a Web robot. While very simple to implement and
understand, robots can easily circumvent detection by setting such fields to some
arbitrary strings or by copying the fields for some well-known user agents. This
is a rampant problem - in our study of Web robot activity from the UConn
SoE Web server, AWStats detected a disproportionate volume of http requests
from the three most popular robots on the Internet – Yahoo Slurp, MSNBot, and
Googlebot [31]. We believe that such a weak technique is still used in popular com-
mercial systems because most administrators still do not consider robot traffic as
a significant cause for concern despite evidence to the contrary.
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Detection through user-agent mapping
Kabe and Miyazaki [67] classify clients based on the specific application being
used, rather than classifying the sessions as human- or robot-induced. They argue
that learning the specific application type is important to ensure that a Web page
is properly presented and to protect the Web site from abuse. Their classification
system partitions the types of user agents into browsers, indexing robots, offline
browsers, link checkers (a type of robot), update detectors (applications that poll
a site to notify a user if there is an update), accelerators (pre-fetchers that get
a target of a hyperlink contained in the current document before the user selects
it), cache servers, and BBS Autopilot (a tool that checks and posts information
or spams advertising on Web forms).
The analysis is applied to the access logs using a two-stage approach. In the
first stage, the user-agent strings retrieved from the access logs are classified ac-
cording to the product. Similar user-agent strings that resemble the same product
(i.e., Mozillia 4.0, MSIE/5, etc.) are aggregated into a single product name using
pre-defined rules. In the second stage, rules are developed to map each product
name to a user-agent characteristic (Browser, Offline Browser, Indexing Robot,
etc.). For example, the user-agent string Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0;
Windows NT 5.0; MathPlayer 2.1; .NET CLR 1.1.4322) represents a visit by
Internet Explorer 6.0 with MathPlayer 2.1 installed. In stage one, this user-agent
field would be aggregated into the Internet Explorer product name. In stage
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two, the Internet Explorer product name would be aggregated into the Browser
characteristic class.
The results indicate that the technique detects 2% more offline browsers (a
type of harvester robot) that would be undetected by a weaker http-based method
(using first token of the user-agent string). This work was among the earliest that
gave a scheme to detect unique types of robots, such as spam harvesters and logo
trackers [96].
Detection through multifaceted log analysis
Huntington et. al. proposed a multi-step log analysis technique which utilizes
syntactic parsing to detect robots that visit the online scientific journal Glycobiol-
ogy [60]. In the first step, the IP addresses that sent a request for robots.txt were
identified and immediately classified as robots. The robots identified in this step
accounted for 0.5% of all traffic. Next, a reverse DNS lookup was performed for
each IP address in the log file. The DNS names that included the terms robot, bot,
search, spider, and crawler were checked by a human expert to be manually clas-
sified as Web robots. The robots identified by the reverse DNS lookup accounted
for 16.1% of all traffic. Finally, the authors used a database of IP addresses of
known robots, that do not declare themselves in their user-agent fields. This IP
address database was obtained from the Web. The robots identified using this IP
address database accounted for an additional 6.5% of traffic. In total, they found
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that their multi-faced syntactic log analysis identified robots that accounted for
almost a third (32.6%) of all traffic. The percentage of robots at this site may
be high because only a small number of human users are interested in visiting an
online scientific journal, whereas archival or scholarly article search services will
commonly employ robots to visit the journal frequently to index or archive new
articles.
2.1.3 Traffic pattern analysis
Detection techniques which analyze patterns in robot traffic use a deeper interpre-
tation of the entries in the Web server access log rather than superficially focusing
on the contents of their user-agent fields. They consider traffic characteristics
such as the types of resources requested and attributes of requests such as the
volume, referring location, percentage of errors, and time-of-day. In establishing
these detection techniques, the authors first study Web robot traffic to identify
distinguishing characteristics and statistical patterns. The detection technique is
then formulated to automatically discover these distinguishing features in order
to classify clients as humans or Web robots.
Detection through syntactic and pattern analysis
Geens et. al. propose a detection technique which combines syntactic analysis
with traffic pattern analysis [44]. They first study the detection performance of
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Approach Correct Incorrect Recall Precision
manual 241 0 1 1
robots.txt 41 0 .1701 1
ip address 167 0 .6929 .9940
user-agent 64 0 .2656 1
Table 2.1: Performance of individual field parsing approaches
several different syntactic parsing methods individually. The first parsing tech-
nique considers requests to the file robots.txt. This file is defined in the Robot
Exclusion Standard [74], that proposes a protocol where Web robots request
robots.txt when they first visit a site. They reason that this is an unreliable
approach to detect robots because this protocol is voluntary, and hence unen-
forceable. Next, they compare the IP address field of the request against a list of
addresses from which Web robots are known to originate. The large number of
robots, combined with the presence of proxy servers and dynamic IP addresses,
lead them to conclude that this also is an unreliable approach to detect robots.
Finally, they compare the user-agent field against the entries in a database of
known regular expressions.
These individual parsing techniques were evaluated on the set of 241 Web
robots that were identified manually from a Web access log. The performance
of each technique was determined using the metrics recall (r) and precision (p)
defined as:
r =
|Scr|
|Sr|
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p =
|Scr|
|Spr|
where Sr is the set of all robot sessions, S
p
r is set of all sessions labeled as a robot
by the detector, and Scr ⊆ Spr is the set of all sessions labeled correctly. r measures
the percentage of robots captured while p measures the precision, or percentage
of sessions correctly classified as robot induced. Table 2.1 summarizes the results,
which suggests that each individual field parsing techniques lead to very few false
positives at the cost of missing a significant number of Web robots.
In order to improve r, the percentage of robots detected, they also consider
three simple patterns in their traffic. The first identifies requests that use the
http HEAD command to retrieve only the headers of the http responses rather
than the entire response. They choose this feature because they reason that
some Web robots will use the HEAD command if they are only interested in
checking whether a certain resource exists, such as link checkers, while humans
using a Web browser will use the http GET command to retrieve an entire html
page from the server. The next pattern checks whether all requests in a session
have an unassigned referrer field. Most robots choose to leave the referring field
blank, while Web browsers often assign the previous page visited to the referrer
field. Finally, the authors examine whether any image files are requested during
a session. They consider image files because most robots are not interested in the
embedded images on html pages.
This combined approach leads to the following rule to detect Web robots: if
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a session contains a request for robots.txt OR its IP address is in the robot IP
list OR its user-agent field is in the robot user-agent list OR the HEAD method
is used OR (the referring field is unassigned AND no images are requested) then
classify the session as a Web robot. This rule obtains a recall value of 0.9731 with
precision 0.8935 over the same Web log consisting of 241 Web robots. Comparing
these results against those in Table 2.1, it can be seen that the combined approach
is superior to using only a single syntactic parsing technique. This study thus
highlights how a traffic pattern analysis approach is stronger than performing
only syntactic analysis.
Detection based on resource request patterns
Guo et. al. exploit the assumption that robots request only certain resources
when they traverse a site [51]. Hence, they try to detect Web robots based on the
patterns in their requested URL resources, giving rise to two new detection algo-
rithms. The first algorithm considers the volume while the second one considers
the rate of resource requests.
The first algorithm involves a classification of requested URL resources. The
resources are divided into 8 different types, namely Web page, document, script,
image, music, video, download, and other. In the first step, entries in the log file
are grouped according to the type of resource requested. In the second step, the
host and user-agent fields are parsed from each group. For each group, records that
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carry the same address and user-agent field are treated as a collection of requests
coming from a single visitor. If the time interval between two requests from the
same visitor is longer than a fixed threshold, then the requests are considered to be
from different sessions. All sessions in all groups are formed using this method. In
the third step, sessions are marked as a “robot candidate” if a single resource type
was requested. In the fourth step, the first three bytes of the IP address and user-
agent fields are checked for each “robot candidate” session. Those that match are
treated as referring to a single robot. Finally, the number of sessions of the same
type generated by the same robot candidate and the number of corresponding
visiting records are counted. This data is collected to recognize sessions that only
request a single main type of resource, although these may be of significant length.
It is possible, however, that humans may also request only one type of resource
during their visit, if for example they know the specific location of a resource and
navigate to it directly. To address this, the algorithm also considers the number
of visits recorded for that client to distinguish robots that make repeated visits
against humans that visit the server only once to obtain some resource. If the
count of the number of sessions of the same type generated by the same robot
candidate and the number of visits recorded both exceed pre-defined thresholds,
the session is classified as being from a robot.
The second algorithm considers the rate at which resources are requested
as well as the member list of a Web page, defined as the aggregation of all URLs
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of the embedded objects (e.g., images, frames, sounds, etc.) in the page. The
idea is to generate a list of the requested resources and the times at which they
were requested. If the time difference of all the requests in a list is greater than
some threshold, then the visitor should be classified as a robot. Furthermore, if
a Web page is accessed but not all embedded objects are requested (e.g. only a
subset of a member list is requested) then the user can also be suspected to be a
robot. The algorithm assumes that the request patterns of humans are governed
by the behavior of a common Web browser. Thus, an initial request for an html
Web page is followed by a barrage of requests for the embedded resources sent by
the browser as it renders the site in real time. Thus, if all the resources are not
requested, then the visitor is less likely to be a human.
The detection capabilities of the two algorithms are compared over the same
set of data. Their experimental results showed that their algorithms detect all
robots that exhibit good behavior (which they define as a robot that requests
the file robots.txt). In terms of accuracy, of the 253 clients marked as possible
robots, 28 clients were positively identified by setting threshold values for the
number of sessions of the same type generated by a robot at ≥ 2 and the number
of corresponding recorded vists at ≥ 5. They set these thresholds based on the
assumption that robots divide their work into several subtasks, and hence, produce
more sessions than a human user. Also, they assume that robots request a “bit
more” content than a human. Of the 28 clients, 20 were “well behaved” while 8
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would have remained undetected as they did not request robots.txt.
Detection through query rate patterns
Duskin et. al. separate robots from humans in Web search engine logs by ana-
lyzing the rate at which search queries are sent [41]. They argue that traditional
detection techniques are inapplicable to access logs recorded by Web search en-
gines because the logs do not record all the fields in the http request packet that
a Web server access log does. Furthermore, the standard approach for detecting
robot requests in a search engine access log, based on setting thresholds off of
various metrics [62], are inadequate. While such a heuristic technique may be
useful to filter a majority of Web robots, it is incapable of detecting those that do
not send search queries at a rapid rate.
In order to improve upon this heuristic approach, the authors propose that
the activity patterns of search users must be studied using multiple metrics, such
as the rate of query submission, time interval between queries, rate at which users
type, duration of sessions of continuous activity, correlation with time of day,
and the regularity of the submitted queries. In this work, the authors examine
the behavior using the average rate of queries submitted and the time interval
between successive queries. The philosophy of the methodology is to first set
thresholds on one attribute in order to partition the sessions into robots and
humans, and then subsequently examine the differences in the distribution of the
27
other attribute for the members in the robot and human classes to identify the
critical distinctions between the two. Thus, their paper introduces two separate
robot detection techniques.
Three data sources are considered: logs from AllTheWeb in 2001 (ATW),
AltaVista in 2002 (AV), and MSN in 2006. First, they analyze each log by clas-
sifying sessions into Web robots and humans based on the number of queries per
session. For the AV and MSN datasets, they classify sessions with less than 10
queries as being a human, and the rest as Web robots. For the ATW dataset,
they classify sessions with less than 50 queries as human and sessions with greater
than 300 sessions as Web robots. Different thresholds are used for the initial clas-
sification because ATW features click-through data, so it is expected that there
will be more entries per user relative to the MSN and AV datasets. They also
distinguish between different queries and resubmission of the same query many
times, which may occur when a user clicks on links from the result page and then
returns to the results, or requests additional search results.
Next, the authors classify Web robot and human sessions based on the
smallest interval between different queries in a session. They assume that humans
cannot submit a new query within one second of the previous query, thus sessions
containing an interval of less than one second are considered to be from robots.
Sessions whose smallest time between queries is greater than 25 seconds in the
ATW and MSN datasets and greater than 10 seconds in the AV dataset are
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classified as humans. The threshold for the AV dataset was lower because of the
shorter delays observed in that log. From this classification, the distributions
of the number of queries submitted by Web robots and humans were studied.
The results show that the probability of a human exhibiting a given number of
queries per session decreases monotonically with the number of queries. It does
not monotonically decrease, however, for Web robots.
Detection using traffic metrics
Lin et. al. introduce a scheme to categorize user sessions into different groups [79].
This study postulates that modern Web traffic is multi-class, consisting of humans,
Web robots, and other Internet protocols, such as peer-to-peer file sharing. They
propose a series of metrics to measure session properties and then use these metrics
to heuristically determine whether a session is generated by a human, Web robot,
or is P2SP (Peer-to-Server-Peer) traffic. To develop their proposed metrics, they
first assume that “short” sessions (defined as sessions with only a single request)
are generated from “gentle crawlers” (a type of Web robot) or P2SP clients, very
long sessions are always generated by a Web robot, and that a Web robot session is
likely to send requests for a larger variety of resources when compared to human or
P2SP clients that target specific information on a Web server. They also assume
that Web robots are most interested in html, htm, jsp, and asp files and favor
them over all other types of resources.
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They define the metric Human Similarity (HS) in order to estimate the
commonality between sessions generated by humans and other classes of users.
The HS of a session is defined as:
HS =
n∑
i=1
s(Ci)w(Si)
where s(Ci) is a score assigned to the response code of the i
th request Ci and
w(Si) is the weight of the type of resource requested during the i
th request Si. If
Si corresponds to a file type commonly requested by P2SP and other Web robots,
such as mp3, wmv, and exe files, the weight is assigned as Si = 10, otherwise
Si = 1. The response code scores are negative for 4xx and 3xx responses, positive
for 206 and 200 responses, and 0 for all other codes. No explanation is provided for
the assignment of these values. They observe that the probability density function
of HS contains four peaks; two that appear near zero on both sides, and two that
represent an extremely high and low HS respectively. Thus, they propose three
threshold values T1, T2, and T3 to separate the pdf into four regions. For sessions
with only one request, if the value of HS falls between threshold values T1 and T3,
it is classified as a Web robot. Otherwise, the region that the session’s HS value
falls into is considered along with the additional metrics to classify a session. The
second metric is Diversity Factor (DF ), which captures how many diverse types
of resources are requested per session. Rather than using the number of unique
resources requested, the authors use unique resource sizes because modern Web
pages deliver content to users through dynamic html, where the same html page
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may deliver different embedded resources every time the page is requested. To
define the metric, they let R = {ri} be the set of all resources requested in a given
session. Then, the DF of a session is given by:
DF =
|{s|∃s ∈ N, s ∈ R}|
|{ri|ri 6= 0}|
Through experimentation, the authors determine that sessions with DF < 0.5 are
highly suspect to be from Web robots. They also propose an automatic way to
find a threshold to classify sessions according to their DF measure, given by the
K largest peaks in the pdf of DF across all sessions. The final metric is Html
Affinity (HA), which reflects the assumption that human sessions will consist of
a mix of resource types while Web robot sessions will be dominated by requests
for content files that contain links to resources. HA is given by the percentage of
requests in a session that are for an html, htm, jsp, or asp type resource.
These metrics are combined to develop an automatic classifier for Web robot
traffic. First, the set of sessions are divided into those that have a single request
and more than one request. Sessions whose HS do not fall between T1 and T3 are
filtered out and considered to be P2SP traffic. For the remaining sessions, those
whose DF is below the computed threshold value or whose HA is above 0.65 are
considered to be Web robots.
They confirm that their scheme can detect all robots that request the file
robots.txt from the logs of various Web servers hosted by Tsinghua University.
They also confirm that the distribution of the metrics of the categorized traffic
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are highly consistent across all sessions in a group, even across long time spans.
2.1.4 Analytical learning
Analytical techniques build on the traffic pattern analysis by developing formal
models to represent the characteristics of web robot visits. A properly trained
model ensures that a useful robot (i.e., one that does not convey random or arbi-
trary behavior) will be successfully detected. These analytical models are trained
by using robot sessions extracted from the Web logs using a simple syntactic
analysis or traffic pattern analysis technique. Analytical techniques can be fur-
ther classified according to the modeling paradigm and the features of robot traffic
considered in detection.
Detection using decision trees
Tan and Kumar attempt to discover Web robot sessions by utilizing a feature
vector of the properties of Web sessions [112]. In the first step, they propose a
new approach to extract sessions from log data. They argue that the standard
approach based on grouping Web log entries according to their IP address and
user-agent fields may not work well since an IP/user-agent pair may contain more
than one session (for example, sessions created by Web users that share the same
proxy server). Furthermore, a session containing multiple IP addresses or user-
agents will become fragmented. Therefore, to determine what session a log entry
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l belongs to, each active session is scanned to check the time difference between l
and the current session, along with some unspecified session contiguity conditions.
If this time difference exceeds a threshold or the conditions are not met, then a
new session is generated starting with log entry l. Before scanning, all the active
sessions are divided into four groups depending on whether the user-agent and IP
address fields match those found in l. The first group consists of sessions where
both user-agent and IP addresses match, followed by the two session groups with
one matching field, and finally the group with no matching fields.
They then derive twenty-five different properties of each session by break-
ing down the sessions into episodes, where an episode corresponds to a request
for an HTML file. Of these, they use only three for the initial classification of
sessions. These include checking if robots.txt was accessed, the percentage of page
requests made with the HEAD http method, and percentage of requests made
with an unassigned referrer field. These attributes are used since they most dis-
tinctly represent sessions likely to be robots, assuming that normally a human
user would not request robots.txt, send a large number of http HEAD requests, or
send requests with unassigned referrer fields.
From this initial class labeling, the observed user-agent fields are parti-
tioned into groups of known robots, known browsers, possible robots, and possi-
ble browsers in the following manner. If a derived session s contains a request for
robots.txt, the session is declared to be a robot. Otherwise, the user-agent fields
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of the requests in the session are considered. If s only ever has requests from one
user agent, and the user agent is a known robot or a possible robot, then s is
labeled as a robot. Otherwise, it is labeled as a human. If s has requests from
multiple user agents, however, the session is labeled as a robot only if there are
no sessions that are known browsers or possible browsers or if the session contains
requests that all use the HEAD http method or requests that all have unassigned
referrer fields.
Finally the technique adopts the C4.5 decision tree algorithm over the la-
beled human and robot sessions using all of the twenty-five derived navigational
attributes. Their objective is to develop a good model to predict Web robot ses-
sions based only on access features and to detect robot traffic as early as possible
during a robot’s visit to the site. This classification model when applied to a data
set suggests that robots can be detected with more than 90% accuracy after four
requests. They find that the recall (r) and precision (p) of their techniques after
more than three requests are greater than 0.82 and 0.95, respectively.
Detection through neural networks
Bomhardt et. al. use a neural network to detect Web robots and compare the
results to a decision tree technique similar to the one by Tan and Kumar [15].
They develop a Web log pre-processing tool called RDT in order to develop the
feature vector for each session.
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The RDT log pre-processing tool operates as follows: in the first step, the
single log entries are broken into sessions by grouping requests that have matching
IP addresses and user-agent fields such that the successive requests are less than
30 minutes apart. Next, the tool automatically classifies sessions using heuristics
known to reliably identify Web robots. If a session contains a request with a login
name, or the session IP address is contained in a pre-constructed list of known IP
address for human users, the session is labeled as a human. If a session contains a
request for a file from a given list of trapfiles that may be deployed (resources that
should never be requested by a human, for example, typical files used in attacks
such as cmd.exe or the file robots.txt), has a user-agent field that exists in a
specified list of known robot agents, or if the session IP address is contained in a
list of known robot IP addresses, the session is labeled as a robot.
Using this technique, the RDT is able to reliably generate a set of sessions
known to be human or robot agents. Next, the attributes that constitute a fea-
ture vector are determined for each robot and human session. Specifically, they
use the total number of page requests, percentage of image requests, percentage
of html requets, total session time, average time between requests, average stan-
dard deviation of time between requests, percentage of error http responses, and
percentage of http commands used to retrieve requests. They also include new
features such as the total number of bytes sent, total site coverage during the
session, and the percentage of responses sent with response codes 200, 2xx, 301,
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302, and 304. Many of these attributes overlap with those used by Tan and Ku-
mar [112], indicating an emerging consensus on what features should be used to
identify Web robot traffic.
Machine learning models of human and Web robot activity are then built
using a neural network, logistic regression, and a decision tree. The latter two were
used to compare the performance of the neural network. Because several attributes
in the feature vectors require at least two requests for their computation, the
datasets were partitioned into three groups: all sessions, single-request-sessions,
and sessions with more than two requests.
The authors evaluate their robot detection technique off of two log files,
one from an educational website and another from an online shop. For each
domain, the data was partitioned so that 40% is used to test the models during
construction, 40% is used to train the models, and 20% is used to validate the
models. They evaluate these models by measuring their recall, precision, and
misclassification rates. The misclassification rates are also compared to a baseline
misclassification rate achieved by a trivial model that always labels a session with
the same class as sessions in the training data set. For the educational website
dataset, they find that the neural network performs best when it is used only for
sessions with more than two requests and a decision tree is used for sessions with
a single request. The recall (r = 0.942) and precision (p = 0.891) achieved by this
combined approach is comparable to the approach proposed by Tan and Kumar.
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For the online shop dataset, the neural network offered the best performance
after three or more page views were considered in a session, with r = 0.947, and
p = 0.954.
Detection via a Bayesian network
Stassopoulou and Dikaiakos presented a Bayesian approach to crawler detec-
tion [108], in which they first identify sessions from the Web log by grouping
entries according to their (IP, user-agent field) pairs. Requests are added to a
session until the time between a request exceeds a certain timeout. The timeout
threshold is dynamic, depending on the number of requests in the session. Then
for each session the maximum sustained click-rate, session duration, percentage
of image requests, percentage of pdf/ps requests, percentage of responses of 4xx
code, and a binary value for if robots.txt were accessed are extracted. These fea-
tures form the nodes (variables) of a naive Bayesian network, where the causal
node C represents the session classification (human or robot) and each effected
node Fi represents an extracted feature. This framework enables them to combine
all pieces of evidence to derive a probability for each hypothesis (i.e., Web robot
vs. human).
The network is trained over a data set of thousands of sessions. But rather
than manually classifying each session as human or robot for training, they use a
heuristic, semi-automatic method. First the sessions are assumed to be human.
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Then the following heuristics are used to determine if a session must be labeled
as a robot: (i) IP addresses of known robots; (ii) the presence of an http request
for robots.txt ; (iii) sessions that last longer than three hours; and (iv) an HTML-
to-image request ratio of more than 10 HTML files per image file. These metrics
were then extracted for the heuristically classified sessions and those modeled
by continuous distributions such as session duration were quantized into discrete
values using the entropy method [104]. The initial values for the root node as well
as the conditional probability distributions for the non-root nodes were computed
from the extracted traffic features. The experiment was performed five separate
times, with each trial using different levels of human and robot sessions in the
training sets. Their results show a best recall r = 0.95 (when the training set
contains an equal number of humans and robots) and at its worst a recall of
r = 0.80 (when the number of human sessions in the training set dominate the
number of robot sessions).
Detection by a Hidden Markov model
Lu and Yu use a hidden Markov model (HMM) to distinguish robot and human
users based on request arrival patterns [82]. They argue that a human visitor
to a Web page is characterized by a burst of http requests from the browser for
all embedded resources, followed by a period of inactivity while the user views
the page. A robot, however, sends requests for resources at a slower rate and
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with a steady period between requests. To capture this phenomenon, the authors
partition time into discrete intervals of the same length. One or more requests
from the same user that arrive in the same time interval is called a batch arrival.
Such a batch arrival is more reflective of a human user than a robot. Each interval
with a batch arrival is considered as an observation for the HMM.
The authors use previously observed robot sequences to train their HMM.
This training set was obtained by examining the user-agent field and extracting
those requests from agents that are clearly robots. Only batch arrivals with more
than 30 requests were considered for training, resulting in 612 observed sequences.
Future incoming request sequences are fed as input to the trained HMM to com-
pute the likelihood that the request sequence is from a robot. This likelihood is
computed by the forward-backward procedure [98]. To test the adequacy of their
technique, an equal mix of robot and human sessions from the same logs as the
training set were composed to form the test data. For this test data, their HMM
yields a detection rate of 0.976 with only 0.02 false positive rate.
2.1.5 Turing test systems
Turing test systems attempt to classify active sessions in real time by forcing the
visitor to take a test in order to determine if the session is human or robot induced,
rather than doing a post-mortem analysis of server access logs. The key aspect
of these systems is the technique employed to force a user into taking the Turing
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test.
Detection via CAPTCHA tests
A common example of a Turing test system is the CAPTCHA test, proposed by
Ahn et. al. [3]. CAPTCHA, which stands for Completely Automated Public
Turing test to tell Computers and Humans Apart, is a challenge response test
embedded in an html page. The server generates a simple test which the user
must pass in order to gain access to some resource. Common CAPTCHA tests
charge users to copy text from a generated image or type a word or a phrase
from a generated sound file. These images and sound files are generated so that
computers are unable to recognize the characters from the image or analyze the
sound file to determine the word or the phrase spoken. CAPTCHA tests have
been employed with great success to prevent robots from gaining access to Web
forums, where a robot can easily harvest e-mail and IP addresses of users that
post to the forums as well as spam unwanted advertisements on discussion threads.
CAPTCHA is also commonly used on pages to create accounts for e-business sites
and signing up for online e-mail services.
It is not impossible for a human user to fail a CAPTCHA or to request the
server to generate a new test, if the image or the audio distortion is too great
to interpret. A human user may also get discouraged if the test is too difficult,
and may even terminate the session. Furthermore, it is possible that humans
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who are only interested in browsing the site for resources accessible without the
CAPTCHA test may not take it. Thus, while CAPTCHA can provably classify
active sessions that are produced by humans, failing or not taking a CAPTCHA
test is not sufficient evidence to classify a session as robot induced.
Building stronger and more sophisticated CAPTCHA systems that are eas-
ier for humans to pass, more difficult for Web robots to break through, and appli-
cable in a wider range of domains is an area of active research. This is due to the
existence of CAPTCHA-solving services, which Web robots could query in order
to bypass a test [90]. Shirali-Shahreza et. al. introduce a CAPTCHA designed
to counter SMS-Spam messages sent to cell phones [106]. When an SMS message
is sent, the carrier’s SMS routing agent sends a challenge to the sender in the
form of an image. The SMS sender then needs to reply with the correct name
of the object in the picture before the routing agent forwards the message to the
recipient. Gossweiler et. al. introduced a new CAPTCHA test that charges users
to re-orient an image such that it is facing upright [48]. This task requires a visual
analysis of the patterns in the image in order to perform a geometric modification.
Image reorientation can be easily performed by humans compared to CAPTCHAs
that use distorted sounds. Such reorientation, however, cannot be performed eas-
ily by automated agents. Kluever et. al. present a CAPTCHA that challenges
the user to label a video and then compare the user input to the video’s tags from
YouTube [73]. Responses are graded based on the string edit distance from the
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tags available, and through stemming the user responses to improve the likelihood
that responses match YouTube tags. They find that the success and failure rate
of their video-based CAPTCHA is similar to the traditional CAPTCHA which
involves transcribing distorted text, but a majority of participants find the video
CAPTCHA to be more enjoyable.
Detection by implicit human browsing behavior
While a Web robot is capable of exhibiting human-like patterns in its traffic, it
can still be captured by a turing test system that checks for behavior unique to
an interface that humans use to access information on the Web. Park et. al.
exploit this by developing a technique which requires users to take a Turing test
implicitly during a session. In this case, human activity is detected by noting the
occurrence of specific events caused by a Web browser [95]. Their technique is
also able to differentiate human traffic from robots that request html pages and
their embedded resources.
To detect events caused by human activity, for each client request a random
key k is generated and paired with the resource requested. This pair is saved
in a table indexed by the IP address that the request comes from. A custom
Javascript is embedded into the pages served to the client dynamically. The
Javascript includes an event handler for mouse movement or key clicks. This
event handler will fetch a fake embedded object whose URL contains k. When
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the event handler sends the request for the fake embedded object, if the k in the
URL matches the value of k stored in the server-side table, the session is classified
as human. If k does not match, or the fake embedded object is never requested,
the session is classified as a robot. The script is obfuscated with additional entries
to prevent it from being deciphered by a robot attempting to discover the proper
value of k. This test determines if a user is human or robot by determining if
mouse or key clicks are ever performed on the Web site.
In practice, some users may disable JavaScript on their browsers. To avoid
classifying such users as robots, common patterns of Web browsers are considered
as well in a second embedded Turing test. The second technique is based on
the observation that many robots crawling specific types of resources, such as
only html or only image files, do not download certain objects on a Web page,
particularly resources containing html presentation information such as CSS or
JavaScript files. To administer this test, a reference to a non-existent CSS file
for each html page is dynamically added upon being served. While Web browsers
should send a request for this CSS file automatically, robots that do not download
presentation related information will not send a request and thus be classified.
Similarly, links to 1-pixel transparent images and silent audio files are also placed
as transparent resources in the html. Because the link is invisible humans should
not request these resources, while robots may analyze the html and make requests.
This technique is implemented in the CoDeeN content distribution net-
43
work [95]. The results show that 95% of human users are detected within the
first 57 requests made, with a false positive rate of 2.4%. These results confirm
that using both techniques together accurately separates robots requesting html
and embedded resources from human visitors. Robots requesting non-html docu-
ments exclusively during a session are not detected, however, as only clients that
request html documents become subject to the implicit Turing test.
Detection of DDoS botnet attacks
Kandula et. al. presented a system implemented as an extension to the Linux
kernel, called Kill-Bots, that is designed to protect Web servers from DDoS attacks
posing as a flash crowd event [69]. A flash crowd event is a phenomenon where the
server experiences a sudden surge in the number of requests it receives. Such DDoS
attacks may be launched by zombies, a type of Web robot installed on infected
computers and controlled by a single mastermind. This mastermind usually has
direct control of thousands or hundreds of thousands of zombie robots which are
all directed to execute the same command. In this case, the zombie robots to be
detected are those used to execute a DDoS attack on a Web server.
Kill-bots is a two function system, combining user authentication with ad-
mission control. The two-stage authentication mechanism is activated when the
server becomes overloaded with active sessions. First, a CAPTCHA test is admin-
istered before any site resources can be accessed. While legitimate users will solve
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the test or at least try to solve the test several times before getting frustrated
and leave the site, zombies will continue to send new requests without attempting
to solve the test. As a result, if the number of unsolved puzzles from a session
exceeds a certain threshold, the IP address of the session is logged as a zombie and
future requests from that IP address are discarded. The second stage of authen-
tication is reached when the size of the set of zombie IP addresses stabilizes. In
this stage, the CAPTCHA test is no longer administered and the Bloom filter is
relied on exclusively to determine if incoming requests from an IP address should
be dropped. This stage enables legitimate users who failed the CAPTCHA test
and left in discouragement to return and use the site even during a DDoS attack.
If too many server resources are consumed by the authentication process, the
remaining available resources may not be sufficient to provide a reasonable quality
of service to the human users who are successfully authenticated into the system.
To address this problem, the second function of Kill-bots is an admission control
system. The admission control will serve puzzles to new, unauthenticated users
with an admission probability α∗, calculated as a function of the current arrival
rate of attacking requests, legitimate requests, average time to serve puzzles and
requests, average number of requests per legitimate session, fraction of the time
the server spends in authentication and serving, and the idle time. A request
from an IP address which has not yet been authenticated with the server but not
blocked will be granted access with probability α∗ and dropped with probability
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1 − α∗. Being adaptive, α∗ self adjusts as the values of the parameters change
during an attack so that server goodput is always maximized.
The system was evaluated by launching a botnet attack on a local Web
server using the PlanetLab wide area network [117]. Legitimate clients were also
setup on the same LAN as the Web server. The results show that their system is
able to quickly adapt during the first stage of the authentication process, causing
the mean response time of requests to expeditiously drop to a value close to the
one when there is no attack. When the second part of the authentication process
is activated, a large increase in goodput is observed due to reduced detection cost
and users accessing the system that previously could not pass the CAPTCHA
test. Despite the ongoing DDoS attack, the server performance is close to the
performance when it is not under attack. Thus, the Kill-Bot system can properly
drop all requests from zombies and produce a correct list of all sessions induced
by them.
2.1.6 Limitations in the state-of-the-art
The techniques presented in this survey reflect major milestones in Web robot
detection over the past decade and also demonstrate how widely varied detection
methods can lead to an effective solution. These techniques have evolved from
simple access log parsing, to using analytical models, to solutions engineered for
specific types of robots and traffic. In this section, we first compare the exist-
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ing classes of techniques to identify which philosophy may be most effective at
detecting both common and unknown, evasive robots. Subsequently, we identify
the issues involved in the implementation of this detection philosophy that we
conjecture to be the most effective.
It is difficult for a third party to experimentally compare the results of these
published detection techniques for two reasons. First, each detection technique
relies on specialized tools or operating system modifications, which would need
to be implemented faithfully. For sophisticated system-level modifications, such
as those used in Kill-bots, a third party implementation cannot be guaranteed to
have high fidelity. Second, it is expected that the accuracy of some techniques will
depend on the data set used for demonstration. For example, the technique based
on navigational patterns may exhibit poor accuracy if the data is from a Web site
with very few pages, making the navigational pattern of a robot similar to most
humans because they are likely to cover the majority of a site during a session.
Furthermore, because the sessions are so short on these types of Web sites, there
may not be enough observations for learning techniques to reach valid conclusions.
Thus, at least a syntactic analysis approach may be the most effective type on such
Web sites. As another example, consider an access log from a very large Web site
that contains entries from a variety of robots with different navigational patterns.
In this case, the navigational pattern and learning techniques will naturally be
more effective than syntactic log analysis. These examples illustrate that the
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prevalent techniques will need to be compared using a variety of logs with varying
features and levels of robot activity to obtain any meaningful conclusions. These
data-intensive demands, the need for proper operating environments and hardware
for each technique, and the lack of implementation details to faithfully reproduce
each detection strategy make a third party comparison of the existing techniques
unrealistic.
The works presented can thus be best compared by considering the strengths
and weaknesses of their underlying detection philosophy. Syntactic log analysis re-
lies only on a textual analysis of the Web logs that considers only explicit recorded
information. Traffic analysis techniques improve upon syntactic analysis by con-
sidering important facets about a robot’s traffic that may be implicit in the logs.
Analytical learning models are considered to be even stronger than traffic analy-
sis as they are able to consider the relationships among these implicit facets that
are considered separately in traffic pattern analysis. Turing test systems may be
considered to be strongest, as they may be able to classify all robots of a specific
type on the Web server in real time. Because they are engineered to detect only
specific types of robots (such as those used in DDoS attacks or those that request
at least one html document), however, their power is limited.
Analytical learning techniques may also be superior in the detection of eva-
sive robots compared to the other three types of techniques (syntactic log analysis,
traffic pattern analysis and Turing test systems) This is because the other three
48
techniques rely on some procedure, algorithm, or system which a savvy author can
engineer a robot to evade. The analytical detection techniques, however, do not
incur this disadvantage because they rely on learning the features of robot traffic
on the server. As a result, it may be difficult for robot authors to circumvent
detection by the analytical techniques. In fact, the only way to avoid detection
by an analytical learning technique is to have a robot emulate the visiting pat-
terns of a human, something that is not simple to achieve. For example, human
users frequently traverse back and forth between pages, reference information,
and/or navigate back to a main page to click on a different link. Such back-and-
forth navigation cannot be accurately emulated by robots, unless a robot was
programmed to follow a specific sequence of requests and wait a specific duration
between requests that mimic a human visitor. Furthermore, a robot that crawls
like a human would discover only a small amount of information, which may or
may not be meaningful. Moreover, robots that mimic humans will not impose any
undue strain on the Web server. Hence, we should be comfortable allowing such
robot traffic to go undetected. In summary, our discussion suggests that analyt-
ical learning models are the most promising types of robot detection techniques
because they not only consider implicit characteristics of robot behavior but also
try to explore the relationship between these implicit characteristics using formal
models.
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2.2 An Integrated Approach for Offline and Real-Time Detection
Our above analysis finds analytical models to be the most promising approach for
offline Web robot detection. However, although offline and online approaches are
synergistic and offer complementary benefits, they have been developed indepen-
dently, with disparate underlying philosophies. Real-time approaches also require
extensive modifications to Web servers, limiting their practical use, and lack the
ability to identify more general classes of ill-behaving robots. Furthermore, recent
evidence suggests that Web robot traffic is in a constant state of evolution [31].
This evolution is natural considering how rapidly new value-added and social ser-
vices are being developed, which require support from more advanced Web robots
to fetch information. This has forced Web robots to make more frequent, de-
manding crawls with sophisticated techniques in order to stay abreast with the
latest available information. Thus, an analytical detection scheme that relies on
a snapshot of robot traffic at any given point of time is sure to become less effec-
tive over time. To reliably detect Web robot sessions despite their constant state
evolution, we need a new analytic approach, capable of operating both offline and
in real-time, that is based on fundamental distinctions between Web robot and
human traffic.
In this section, we present a novel, integrated approach to detect Web robots.
The approach relies on training analytical models over the request patterns of
robots and humans for different types of resources. We motivate why the resource
50
request patterns of robots and humans are intrinsic to their respective behaviors,
and hence, are fundamentally distinct from each other. We also describe how
the contrasts in these request patterns are likely to be immutable and persistent,
even if robots and humans change their behaviors over time. We evaluate the per-
formance of our methodology for both offline and real-time detection by playing
back multiple streams of robot and human sessions collected from the University
of Connecticut (UConn) School of Engineering (SoE) Web server. The results in-
dicate that our approach can separate robots from humans with high accuracy for
varying session lengths and proportions of robot traffic. Our approach thus offers
two key advantages over contemporary detection techniques, namely, it: (i) defines
a model based on a fundamental, time-invariant difference between robot and hu-
man behavior; and (ii) can be simultaneously used for highly accurate offline and
real-time detection.
2.2.1 Resource request patterns
We hypothesize that the patterns of requests for resources made within robot and
human traffic are distinct, and is not expected to change over time desptie the
constant evolution of Web robots. This distinction arises because human users
retrieve information off of the Web via some interface, such as a Web browser. This
interface forces the user’s session to request additional resources automatically.
Most Web browsers, for example, retrieve the html page requested, parse through
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it, and then send a barrage of requests to the server for embedded resources on
the page such as images, streaming videos, and client side scripts to execute.
These scripts may also cause additional artifacts on the page to be requested and
then displayed to the user, such as pop-up windows or advertisements within the
Web page being viewed. Thus, the temporal resource request patterns of human
visitors are best represented as short bursts of a large volume of requests followed
by a period of little activity. In contrast, Web robots are able to make their own
decisions about what resources linked on an html to request and may choose to
execute the scripts available on a site if they have the capacity to do so.
Defining Request Patterns
We define a session as a sequence of requests from the same IP address and user-
agent field, where the time between any two consecutive requests is less than 30
minutes [86]. Subsequently, we define a request pattern as an ordered sequence
of specific resources that are requested in a session. Because a Web server hosts
numerous unique resources, a pattern that lists specific resources will be distinct
and unique for each session. Therefore, this representation will neither identify
the similarities across robot (human) sessions nor expose the differences between
robot and human sessions. Therefore, to expose these similarities and differences,
we generalize the notion of a resource request pattern, and represent it in terms
of resource types rather than specific resources.
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For this generalized representation, we classified the resources that Web
servers may host into a small number of distinct categories. We collected Web
server access logs from the UConn SoE Web Server that captured all requests
between the years 2007 and 2009. Through a comprehensive manual analysis of
this log, we identified 172 unique resource extensions. We conjecture that this
two-year log captures most if not all the resources hosted on the UConn server
because the: (i) length of the log is extensive; (ii) number of unique resource
extensions discovered is low; and (iii) regular updates to the SoE web server only
consist of news articles and changes to faculty sites, which do not introduce any
new resource extensions.
We partitioned these extensions into nine classes, summarized in Table 2.2.
The table also shows representative resource extensions assigned to each class.
For example, txt, css, and xml files are assigned to the txt class. html, php, jsp,
and cgi files, used by a Web browser to display information and execute scripts,
are assigned to the web class. Extensions classified into the doc class include rich-
text documents that contain information that is formatted to be read by specific
software.
To assess whether our scheme reasonably classifies the resources on the SoE
server, we examined whether the distribution of requests for the various types of
resources is consistent with how resources might be requested from the UConn
Web server. This distribution, shown in Figure 2.2, indicates that over half of
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Class Extensions
text txt, xml, sty, tex, cpp, java
web html,htm, asp, jsp, php, cgi, js
img png, tiff, jpg, ico, raw, pgm
doc xls, doc, ppt, pdf, ps, dvi
av avi, mp3, wmv, mpg, wmv
prog exe, dll, dat, msi, jar
compressed zip, rar, gzip, tar, gz, 7z
malformed request strings that are not well-formed
noExtension request for directory contents
Table 2.2: Example class-wise assignment of resources
Fig. 2.2: Distribution of resource requests for SoE server
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the requests are for img resources, almost one quarter are for web resources, and
nearly one-fifth are for txt and doc resources taken together. This distribution is
consistent with what might be expected from the SoE server because it primarily
hosts two types of pages. The first type includes pages that convey information
about the school, and published news articles about faculty, students, and depart-
ments. These commonly accessed pages primarily feature web and img resource
types. The second type include faculty, lab, and student pages that share infor-
mation about faculty members and research labs, and disseminate publications
and data. Such pages include a combination of web, img, and doc resources. Fi-
nally, the percentage of noe requests may be accounted for by external links that
point to root folders which redirect to an html page. Thus, these nine classes can
accurately explain the frequencies with which different types of resources may be
requested from the SoE server. We note that these nine classes may not always
be adequate to group resources hosted on Web servers from all domains. How-
ever, we believe that they can provide a solid starting point for customizing a
domain-specific resource classification scheme.
2.2.2 Distinguishing robots from humans
We argue that the resource request patterns of Web robots will be inherently
distinct from those of humans. Moreover, these intrinsic contrasts between the
request patterns of robots and humans are likely to be immutable despite any
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evolution in their behaviors. This is because these contrasts are grounded in the
different ways in which robots and humans interact with Web sites. Humans in-
teract through Web browsers that retrieve and parse the requested html pages and
then send a barrage of requests for resources embedded on those pages. These
embedded resources include images, streaming videos, and client-side scripts. Be-
cause human interactions are driven by browsers, we expect little variation in the
request patterns from one user to another and from one session to the next. Fur-
thermore, even if the behavior of these browsers were to change, request patterns
would still be limited by the structure of the Web site. For example, a human vis-
itor will generally not request a doc file, before requesting either the web file which
links the doc file or another resource that is also embedded on the same Web page.
On the contrary, all robots regardless of their functionality, workload, or crawl-
ing algorithm, make individual decisions about what resources to request [33].
Thus, they may only request a single type of resource during a session, may not
request the resources embedded within an html page, and depending on their of-
fline knowledge of a Web site, may request two consecutive resources located on
different pages. Thus, the resource request pattern of Web robots will show great
variability and flexibility while those of humans will be rigid because they are
constrained by the well-understood behavior of Web browsers and structures of
Web sites.
Table 2.3 shows sample sequences of resource requests from different ses-
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sions. These sequences illustrate the differences between request patterns of hu-
mans and robots. A typical human session starts with a request for either a web
or a noe resource and is followed by a number of requests for txt and img files.
Following a request for a web or a noe resource, a human session sends a number of
requests for other web, txt, and img resources. These txt resources may correspond
to css, and xml files that are used by the browser to define the look and feel of
the page, while the img requests may correspond to the embedded images within
the page. In contrast, a robot session starts with a request for a web, a txt, or a
noe resource, and the subsequent order of resource requests follows no particular
pattern. For example, the request pattern of MJI2bot shows that it almost ex-
clusively requests web resources, suggesting that it operates as an indexer robot
for search engines. ICC-Crawler, on the other hand, exhibits a different pattern
where it sends a number of requests for noe resources. Such behavior could mean
that a robot is sending malformed requests or is trying to access directory listings
at the site. In summary, we see that the resource request patterns of humans
are similar across sessions, whereas the request patterns of robots vary between
robots and are also different from human sessions.
We also expect this contrast in the resource request patterns between robots
and humans to persist unless Web robots voluntarily restrict their behavior to ap-
pear like humans. Robots that behave like humans, however, are unlikely because
it requires them to request numerous useless html and embedded resources. Fur-
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User Sample Request Pattern
Human noe,img,img,img,img,img,img,img,img,img,img,img,img,img
Human web,img,img,img,web,img,img,img,web,img,img,img,web,img
Human noe,txt,txt,img,img,txt,img,img,img,img,img,img,img,img,img,img
Human noe,txt,txt,img,img,txt,img,img,img,img,img,img,img,img,img,img
MJ12bot web,web,noe,web,web,txt,web,web,web,web,web,web,web,web,web
Yandex txt,noe,noe,txt,doc,doc,web,doc,web,doc,doc,web,web,web,web
W3C-checklink txt,noe,txt,txt,noe,web,txt,noe,txt,noe,txt,noe,txt,txt,noe
ICC-Crawler noe,web,web,web,noe,noe,noe,noe,noe,noe,noe,noe,noe,web,web
Table 2.3: Sample resource request patterns of robots and humans
thermore, human-like robots must adapt to short sessions and limit the intensity
of their request rates to mimic the inter-request think times of humans [83]. Mod-
ern robots that seek the dynamic and time-sensitive information that users share
on Web sites and social media services would find such behaviors inefficient. In
summary, because of these fundamental and immutable differences in the resource
request patterns between robots and humans, a detection approach rooted in iden-
tifying these differences may be accurate, reliable, and also stand the test of time.
2.2.3 Detection approach
In this section, we introduce a discrete time Markov chain (DTMC) model [115]
to represent resource request patterns. Subsequently, we discuss how the DTMC
model can be used to detect Web robots.
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Model Representation
We identify a resource request pattern for each session based on the resource
classification scheme defined in Section 2.2.2. Diagrammatically, we then represent
all possible resource request patterns in a session using a resource request graph,
shown in Figure 2.3. A session begins at one of the nodes of the graph and at
each time step either moves to another node or stays at the current node. The
progression of a collection of sessions along this graph can be modeled using a
DTMC where the states represent requests for specific types of resources and the
transitions represent the probability that a request for one type is followed by a
request for another type.
Mathematically, the DTMC may be represented as a tuple (s,P) where the
ith element of the entrance vector s represents the probability that a session starts
at resource type i, and pi,j, which is the (i, j)
th element of the transition matrix P
is the probability that a request for resource type j follows a request for resource
type i. Transition probabilities can be estimated as pi,j = ri,j/mi, where ri,j is the
number of times resource type j is requested after type i, and mi is the number
of times resource type i is requested across all sessions. Similarly, si is estimated
as ci/n, where ci is the number of sessions that start with a request for resource
type i and n is the total number of sessions considered. ri,j, mi, and ci can be
estimated using the data contained within the Web server access log. Through
these definitions, (s,P) characterizes the resource request pattern of the sessions
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Fig. 2.3: Resource request graph
used to estimate s and P.
The Markov assumption underlying the DTMC model may be rational be-
cause a dependence between the requests for types of resources is unlikely for
both robots and humans. Human requests for resource types depend at most
on the previous request. For example, human sessions session will not request
a doc resource on a Web page, before requesting the web resource that links the
document. Similarly, typical Web robots that crawl using depth- and breadth-
first algorithms [85] decide which resource to request after considering only the
previous one.
Detection Algorithm
To detect whether a given session arises from a robot or a human, we define
S = (x1, x2, ..., xn) as the resource request pattern of a session with n requests.
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The log-probability that the DTMC (s,P) will generate S is given by:
logPr(S|s,P) = log sx1 +
n∑
i=2
log pxi−1,xi
Let R = (sr,Pr) denote the DTMC that represents Web robot sessions and H =
(sh,Ph) denote the DTMC that represents human sessions. Since log a > log b iff
a > b, if logPr(S|R) > logPr(S|H), S is more likely to have been generated by
R, and should be classified as being generated by a robot. Otherwise, S should
be classified as a human.
The approach aggregates log-probabilities as a sum instead of collecting raw
probabilities as a product in order to avoid multiplying many small values, which
may lead to an underflow in computation. Moreover, these log-probabilities can
be used to differentiate between robot and human sessions because such differen-
tiation only requires us to consider the relative difference in the probabilities that
the session may be generated by H or R, and not their actual values.
Model Evaluation
We evaluate the performance of our detector using the following, standard set of
metrics that are commonly used to evaluate the performance of a binary classi-
fier [113]:
• Recall (r): Recall is calculated as the the total number of robot sessions
identified by the detector divided by the number of true positive (robot ses-
sions correctly classified as robot) and false negative (robot sessions wrongly
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classified as human) classifications. It thus represents the fraction of all
robots in a test set that were correctly identified, and captures the ability
of the detector to positively identify robot sessions. The false negative rate
of the detector is thus given by 1− r.
• Precision (p): Precision is computed as the actual total number of robot
sessions identified by the detector divided by the number of true positive and
false positive (human sessions wrongly classified as a robot) classifications.
It captures the detector’s propensity to incorrectly label a human session as
a robot. The false positive rate of the detector is thus given by 1− p.
• F1 measure: The F1 score is a measure of the detector’s overall accuracy
which combines both its precision and recall into a single value [101]. It is
defined as the harmonic mean of precision and recall, so that F1 approaches
its highest value of 1 if and only if both the false positive and false negative
rates of the detector approach 0. On the other hand, F1 approaches its
lowest value of 0 as either the false positive or false negative rate approach
1. Because our detector must have low false positive and negative rates, we
use the F1 measure to evaluate its overall quality in addition to precision
and recall.
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Model Training
We generated a data set from the access logs from the UConn SoE Web server
from the period April 2008 to August 2008 to train the model. Typically, data
sets used to train analytical robot detection models are generated by manually
labeling sessions as robot or human [107]. In this manual approach, an expert
examines the IP address or user-agent field of a request, and uses prior knowledge
and practical experience to identify those values that correspond to robots. While
this manual examination can distinguish between robot and human sessions with
high accuracy; the process is cumbersome, time-consuming and limits the number
of sessions that can be labeled. Moreover, the labeling is limited only to the
knowledge of a few experts. Therefore, to generate a larger training set, we
developed an automated, heuristic procedure, which relies on a database of regular
expressions that represent user-agent fields of Web robots. By using this database,
taken from version 6.7 of the tool AWStats [9], we expect to produce a training
set that is more inclusive because it incorporates the collective knowledge of many
administrators, researchers, and other experts that have contributed to building
this database. The automated procedure comprises the following steps shown in
Figure 2.4:
1. If the user-agent field of a session matches an entry in the database, label
the session as robot.
2. If the IP address of a session matches an IP address within the UConn
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Fig. 2.4: Heuristic procedure to build training sets
domain, and its user-agent field matches one used by a common browser,
label the session as human.
3. If the IP address of a session is outside of UConn, the user-agent field
matches one used by a common browser, the initial request of the session is
for the home page, and a subsequent request follows within 1 second for an
embedded resource on the home page, label the session as human.
4. If none of the above rules apply, do not include the session in the training
set.
Step 3 comprises a verification sequence to ensure that the human sessions
added to the training set are genuine. Under this verification sequence, a session
is admitted as human only if the user user-agent field of a request matches that
of a Web browser, the first request is for the homepage, and a subsequent request
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Fig. 2.5: Trained detection models
for an embedded resource on the home page arrives within 1 second. We impose
the 1 second threshold to ensure that the resources embedded within the page are
requested immediately following the home page, which is a signature behavior of
Web browsers. Thus, to apply this verification sequence, we compiled a list of
embedded resources on the site’s homepage. We used this heuristic procedure to
label sessions that were randomly sampled from the Web access log. We repeated
this random sampling until we collected 1000 robot and 1000 human sessions for
the training set. We chose to collect an equal number of human and robot sessions
because a previous study [108] suggested that an analytical model trained with an
equal number of robot and human sessions provides the highest level of detection
accuracy.
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To assess whether the heuristic procedure differentiates between robot and
human sessions accurately, we examine the human and robot DTMCs trained
using this set. We reason that if the sessions are labeled accurately then the
transition probabilities of these DTMCs should embody distinct behaviors of these
two types of visitors. Figure 2.5(a) shows that the robot DTMC features a high
probability of consecutive requests to img files and subsequent requests to a web
resource following a request for any type of file. Multiple img file requests likely
correspond to indexer robots who only visit the site to collect images for search
engines. We find that web files are likely to be requested following any other
type of resource request, which matches the behavior of robots who request a web
resource to identify new links after collecting all files of interest on the present
page. We also observe a weaker, but still non-negligible probability of subsequent
requests to doc, noExtension, and txt resources, irrespective of the type of the
previously requested resource. Since these are the most common types of resources
hosted on the Web site as seen in Figure 2.2, this pattern matches the behavior
of more general indexer robots who send requests for all kinds of available files.
The human DTMC in Figure 2.5(b) shows a decidedly different pattern of
behavior compared to Web robots. Here, we find a high probability that web,
img, malformed, and txt resources are requested following a web resource. This
pattern correlates with the expected behavior of Web browsers that send requests
for embedded resources after an html page is retrieved. We also see that img files
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are requested after txt, prog, noExtension, other img files, or av files. In addition,
unlike the robot DTMC, the human DTMC contains near zero probabilities for
submitting a noExtension request. This is because although robots may wish to
list the directory of a Web page by sending a noExtension request, humans almost
always submit requests for specific resources instead of requesting a directory
listing.
2.2.4 Offline detection analysis
In this section, we summarize the performance of the DTMC models when used
to detect robots offline. In offline detection, we tested the detector with seven
different data sets, each extracted from a month-long access log. Each test data
set consisted of 10, 000 sessions divided equally among Web robots and humans.
In offline detection, the detector analyzed all the resource requests in a session
before classifying it as robot or human.
For all the seven test sets, we find that both precision and recall lie approx-
imately between 0.8 and 0.86. In other words, the detector can correctly identify
between 80 and 86% of all the robots. The F1 measure lies between 0.828 and
0.853 for every test set, confirming that both recall and precision are high and
that the detector has overall excellent performance.
In these preliminary experiments, the data sets are equally balanced between
robot and human sessions to illustrate the potential of the detector. In practice,
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Test Set r p F1
Feb. 2008 0.8072 0.8502 0.8282
Mar. 2008 0.8374 0.8531 0.8452
Oct. 2008 0.8418 0.8602 0.8509
Nov. 2008 0.8436 0.8620 0.8527
Dec. 2008 0.8498 0.8429 0.8463
Table 2.4: Performance metrics for offline detection
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Fig. 2.6: Evaluation metrics for varying session length
however, the detector must identify robots from different profiles of Web traffic,
which may vary along at least two dimensions: (i) number of requests in each
session (session length) and (ii) proportions of robot and human sessions (session
mixture). Therefore, we assess the performance of the detector by varying these
two properties of the test data sets.
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Varying Session Length
In the first set of experiments, we expected the detector to classify a session
after analyzing a pre-defined number of requests, without waiting for the session
to terminate. Figure 2.6 shows the performance metrics for the February 2008
test set. The metrics for the other sets are not shown because they exhibited
similar trends. The recall metric remains stable across the different session lengths
because the log probabilities Pr(S|R) and Pr(S|H) quickly converge. Precision
peaks at 0.855 after 12 requests and declines steadily until about 20 requests after
which it stabilizes. This suggests, perhaps contrary to the common belief, that
analyzing additional requests within a session does not improve the false positive
rate.
These experiments show how the detector can reliably identify most robot
sessions within just a few requests. Furthermore, it takes only 12 requests for
the F1 metric to reach within 0.1 of its steady-state value. In other words, the
detector is capable of distinguishing between robot and human sessions so long as
each session contains at least 12 requests, which is likely for sessions on most Web
domains. In human sessions, Web browsers will request every resource embedded
on a page, and the number of such resources on a single page is typically much
greater than 122. Similarly, an average robot session contains at least hundreds of
requests [4]. Thus, the detector is expected to accurately classify sessions despite
2https://developers.google.com/speed/articles/web-metrics
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their varying lengths.
Varying Session Mixture
Next, we evaluated the performance of the detector over test sets with varying
proportions of robot and human sessions. For every month-long test set, we
changed the proportion of robot and human sessions by randomly deleting or
duplicating robot sessions until a desired mixture was achieved. Thus, for each
month, we created an additional 9 data sets, with the proportion of robot sessions
varying between 10% and 90%, in steps of 10%. We assessed the performance of
the detector for all these data sets.
Unlike the session length experiments, performance was slightly different
for each month, so we report the results for all the 9 data sets generated for
each month in Figure 2.7. In Figure 2.7(c), we see how the F1 measure rapidly
improves as the proportion of robot traffic increases. This increase occurs because
of a reduction in the false positives as illustrated by an increase in the precision
metric in Figure 2.7(a). Akin to session length, the F1 measure is not significantly
influenced by the small fluctuation in recall shown in Figure 2.7(b). This rise in
the F1 measure is very desirable because it suggests that the detector will continue
to accurately detect Web robot sessions even as the proportion of Web robot traffic
faced by a server continues to grow.
In summary, the performance of our approach in offline detection is very
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Fig. 2.7: Evaluation metrics with varying session mixture
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promising. For a test set containing an equal number of robot and human ses-
sions, the F1 measure of the detector approaches 0.85. Furthermore, the detector
can accurately classify a session after analyzing only 12 requests. Finally, the per-
formance improves with an increase in the proportion of robot traffic, suggesting
that the approach will not cease to be effective as the level of robot traffic seen
by Web servers continues to rise.
2.2.5 Real-time detection
In real-time detection, the detector is expected to classify a session as robot or
human after analyzing only the first few requests. We believe that our approach
lends itself well to such real-time detection because the F1 measure converges
after analyzing a few requests as seen in Section 2.2.4. In this section, we present
the modified algorithm for real-time detection and analyze its sensitivity and
performance.
Modified Algorithm
To adapt the detection algorithm for identifying sessions in real time, we introduce
two new parameters k and ∆. k specifies the minimum number of requests that
the detector must analyze before classifying a session. We note that while it is
desirable that the detector classifies an active session early and by analyzing as
few requests as possible, it is necessary to impose a minimum number to mitigate
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Fig. 2.8: Modified algorithm for real-time detection
the impact of fluctuations in the probabilites Pr(S|R) and Pr(S|H) likely during
the first few requests in S on the classification decision. After at least k requests
have been analyzed, if the difference in these log probabilities exceeds the second
parameter ∆, the detector stops and classifies a session based on the model that
has a higher probabilitiy. Otherwise, for every additional request, the detector
continues to update the log probabilities until the difference is larger than ∆.
The above procedure used for classifying each session in real time, also shown
in Figure 2.8, is summarized as follows:
1. Update logPr(S|R) and logPr(S|H) for every new request.
2. After at least k requests from S have been analyzed, whenever a new request
is received compute D = log(Pr(S|R)/Pr(S|H)).
3. If |D| < ∆, do not classify S. Otherwise, if D ≥ 0, classify S as a robot and
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if D < 0 classify S as a human.
4. If a session ends before classification, use offline detection.
The values of both k and ∆ control the granularity of the classification
decision. For a small value of ∆, the detector can reach a classification decision
earlier, allowing a differentiated treatment to robots sooner. However, premature
classification decisions increase the risk of discriminating against legitimate human
visitors. Therefore, to better understand the impact of ∆ on the classification
decision, we visualize the difference in the log probabilities Pr(S|R) and Pr(S|H)
in Figure 2.9. We see that the difference in these probabilities stays similar and
low over a wide range, and does not become appreciable until either Pr(S|R) or
Pr(S|H) approach 1. Thus, if we set ∆ > 2, a session will be classified only if
there is near certainty that it is generated either by R or H and not the other
one. This will lead to a higher F1 measure, albeit at the expense of not classifying
many sessions. Thus, setting ∆ in the range 0.5 ≤ ∆ < 2 will allow the detector
to classify most sessions with broad degrees of confidence. We note that even after
setting k and ∆ to allow for classification with moderate certainty, the detector will
still fail to classify those sessions with less than k requests or with request patterns
that are not as distinct. Thus, in addition to the measures in Section 2.2.3, we use
the percentage of unclassified sessions to evaluate the sensitivity of the real-time
detector to the values of k and ∆.
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Fig. 2.9: Difference between the logs of Pr(S|R) and Pr(S|H)
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Sensitivity Analysis
To evaluate the sensitivity of the detector to parameters k and ∆, we replayed
the arrival stream of robot and human requests used to evaluate the performance
in offline detection in Section 2.2.4. We vary k in the range of 2 and 20 and ∆ in
the range of 0.5 and 2 as discussed in Section 2.2.5. Both parameters were varied
simultaneously to expose cross-dependence, if any, between them. In this section,
we present the results from the replay of the February 2008 data set. Measures
for the other data sets exhibited similar trends and are not shown here.
Figure 2.10 visualizes the proportion of unclassified sessions as a function
of k and ∆. As expected, the percentage of sessions that remain unclassified
increase with ∆ across all values of k. By the absolute measure, however, only
10% of the sessions remain unclassified for ∆ ≥ 1.85 and k > 3. Moreover, this
percentage decreases to approximately 5% starting at ∆ = 1.4. Even though
only a small percentage of sessions remain unclassified at ∆ = 1.4, our confidence
in the classification decision remains high because the probabilities P (S|R) and
P (S|H) need to be very different for the detector to label a session. For example,
if P (S|R) = 0.7, ∆ = 1.4 requires that P (S|H) ≤ 0.172 before we can classify S
as a robot. Thus, the real-time detector is able to classify sessions with reasonable
confidence while allowing just a small percentage of sessions to remain unclassified.
We examine recall, precision and F1 as a function of ∆ and k for the February
2008 test set. Figure 2.11 shows that precision varies widely if we set k < 12 for
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low values of ∆. This is consistent with the performance of the offline detector in
Figure 2.6, where the F1 metric stabilized only after 12 requests. For ∆ ≤ 1.40,
the changes in precision when k ≤ 10 is significant, as large values of ∆ preclude
some sessions from being classified before they are terminated. For example, if
we let k = 6, precision rises by approximately 0.03 as ∆ increases. When k is
greater than 10, however, the influence of ∆ begins to wane. This is because after
examining the first 10 requests for most sessions, the difference between Pr(S|R)
and Pr(S|H) becomes so significant that only very large values of ∆ will preclude
the session from being classified. When k ≥ 10, we achieve a very low false positive
rate (approximately 5%), as precision reaches nearly 0.95 for ∆ ≥ 1.4.
Figure 2.11 examines recall as a function of k and ∆. Unlike precision,
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Fig. 2.11: Performance metrics for varying k and ∆
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which shows no clear trend across different values of ∆, recall changes similarly
as a function of k for different values of ∆. Recall is also more sensitive to k
compared to precision, as it increases by approximately 0.10 as 3 ≤ k ≤ 12. Fig-
ure 2.11(c) shows F1 as a function of ∆ and k. For k ≥ 4, F1 remains above
0.85, is not strongly influenced by the value of ∆, and gradually increases to an
extremely promising F1 = 0.95 at k > 13.
In summary, we find that our real-time detection approach can achieve very high
performance (F1 = 0.95) with a very low false positive rate, while letting less than
5% of all sessions remain unclassified when we use ∆ = 1.7 and k > 13.
2.3 Chapter Summary
This chapter presented a comprehensive survey and a novel classification for con-
temporary Web robot detection techniques, and presented a new approach for
detecting Web robots that addresses the current limitations in the state-of-the-
art. Through a critical analysis and comparison of the categories that detection
techniques fall under, we argued that analytical learning techniques have the most
potential to provide robust Web robot detection. To address the key limitation of
such approaches, namely, their dependency on learning traffic features that may
change as Web robot traffic evolves over time, our approach is based on learning
the differences within the resource request patterns of robots and humans, which
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is a fundamental distinction that is unlikely to change over time. Out experimen-
tal results indicated that our detection approach is accurate and reliable, both in
the offline and real-time mode.
Chapter 3
Robot Classification
Although many Web robots may visit a Web server to advance a noteworthy cause,
like information retrieval for news aggregation services and web search indexing,
others may be ill-behaved and/or malicious and may exhibit undesirable behavior
including:
1. not following the operational limits specified by robots.txt or by standards
that define ethical Web robot behavior [109];
2. spying on or censoring the flow of information; and
3. visiting sites to copy html code and identify ways to attack Web servers
The crawls of Web robots that exhibit such behaviors should ideally be curtailed,
or even blocked; in the best case, they consume precious resources and in the
worst case they may compromise the security, functionality, privacy, and perfor-
mance of a Web server. To enable server administrators to curtail the activities of
undesirable robots, a method that can quickly distinguish between well-behaved,
benign robots and ill-behaved, malicious ones is essential. To facilitate such dis-
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tinction, it is first necessary to understand the key properties of their crawling
behavior, classify them based on these crawling properties, and then infer the
purpose of their visits based on this classification. While it may not be feasible to
definitively infer the intent of a robot and its creator from such classification, such
partitioning may nevertheless provide significant insights into whether a robot’s
behavior follows desirable or undesirable trends. The development of a taxonomy
for Web robots also provides a framework for cataloguing and understanding the
wide variety of contemporary Web robots that have arisen out of new kinds of
Web services and seek to collect dynamic, time-sensitive opinions and information
on the Web [16,120,121].
In this chapter, we classify and then interpret the types of Web robots that
constitute contemporary streams of Web traffic. Our novel classification scheme
using three orthogonal perspectives: first via the lens of a robot’s stated func-
tionality, then by examining the resources it targets, and finally by the workload
their visits impose on the Web server. Each viewpoint allows us to observe the
properties of a Web robot that would be invisible from the alternate perspective.
Furthermore, the observations across these views can be leveraged to determine
the likelihood that a robot is ill-behaved or has malicious intent. The classification
framework is applied to Web robots identified across an entire year of requests to
the UConn SoE Web server1.
1Portions of this chapter were previously written and published by the author in [31,32,38,33].
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Fig. 3.1: Distribution of the number of requests for robots.txt
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.1 gives a preliminary anal-
ysis of Web robot requests on the SoE Web server. Sections 3.2, 3.3, and 3.4
presents and applies the functional, resource, and characteristic dimensions of our
classification scheme, respectively, over Web robot sessions.
3.1 Preliminary Analysis
To motivate the need for a comprehensive robot classification scheme, we first
present a preliminary analysis of Web robot requests and demonstrate that they
are highly varying. This preliminary analysis is based on traffic collected on the
UConn SoE Web server between February 2007 and January 2008.
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3.1.1 Robot requests for robots.txt
Our analysis indcated that only 78 of all robots found (58%) requested the file
robots.txt, which gives the robot instructions as to what resources should and
should not be visited during their crawl. Figure 3.1 plots the shows the cumulative
distribution function (CDF) of the number of requests for the file robots.txt.
Approximately half of the 78 robots requested the file less than 100 times, whereas
the request count for the other half varies widely from 100 to 10,000. The CDF
exhibits a linear trend when the number of requests is plotted on a log scale. This
means the request counts are evenly distributed across a large range, making it
difficult to determine a representative range of frequencies with which a majority
of the robots will request this file. Nearly 40% of the robots choose to completely
ignore these guidelines, and those that do robots.txt are only partially interested
in following the guidelines specified within.
3.1.2 Robot HTTP requests
Figure 3.2 shows a log plot of the number of HTTP requests from robots and
from all users (including robots) received by the server. We see that the total
month-to-month traffic decreases from May through August. During this period
classes were not in session, due to which only a few students needed access to
SoE sites. Traffic returns to pre-May levels in September, when classes resume.
Although the total number of requests seen by the server follows this pattern,
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Fig. 3.2: HTTP requests from robots and all users
the number of HTTP requests sent by robots does not exhibit any pattern. In
fact, there is no correlation between the number of requests sent by robots to
the month or to the overall traffic presented. These findings are consistent with
the previous work by Lu et. al. which discusses how Web robots are not aware
of the current server workload [126]. Thus, Web robots disregard the seasonal
busy periods of human traffic based on the domain of the server (for example, low
workload during the summer for academic servers or a high workload during the
holiday season for e -commerce servers) and continue to send requests ignoring
these predictable workload patterns.
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Robot Traffic All Traffic
HTTP Requests 3,198,530 17,293,248
Bandwidth Consumed 328.80 GB 4,185.98 GB
Table 3.1: Request and bandwidth consumption, Jan 2007 - Feb 2008
3.1.3 Robot traffic intensity
Table 3.1 reveals the total bandwidth and number of requests received by the
server over the entire period. Robots sent approximately 18.49% of all the re-
quests, and consumed around 7.68% of the bandwidth. The proportion of band-
width attributed to robots may be conservative because of the domain of the server
– it is not uncommon for faculty, staff, and students connected on the same LAN
as the SoE server to download large documents, presentations, and disc images of
software. As a result, the bandwidth consumption of humans may be inflated rel-
ative to the bandwidth consumed by the robots. Furthermore, constant backups
of data across the network cause human users to consume additional bandwidth.
Thus, although the internal traffic drives down the relative proportion of band-
width consumed by robots, it is possible that this consumption, as a proportion
of external traffic, may be significant because approximately one in five requests
originates from Web robots.
This preliminary analysis suggests that Web robots exhibit different levels of
commitment in following the crawling guidelines specified in robots.txt, represent a
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significant percentage of the traffic handled by a Web server, consume a significant
amount of bandwidth, and are agnostic to the busy periods of a Web server. To
better understand and then prepare Web servers for handling their requests, it
is necessary to classify robots into groups that exhibit similar crawling behaviors
and demand characteristics.
3.2 Functional Classification
In the functional classification scheme, we partition Web robots into classes ac-
cording to their functions. To enable this classification, we followed a two-step
process to research the functionality of the 134 robots identified from the UConn
SoE log by the tool AWStats [9]. In the first step, we determined if the user-agent
field of the HTTP request contained a URL. A well-behaved robot uses a Web
site to identify itself and to explain its functionality, and AWStats provides links
to these URLs. When a URL did not exist, we manually searched the Internet
to determine the function of the robot. For most robots, we were able to either
verify their function based on a Web site developed by the robot’s authors, Web
sites that list the functionality of common robots, or sites that host discussions
among server administrators about its functionality. If a robot’s function could
not be ascertained using this two-step process, we classified it as unknown.
If we classified a robot’s function based on the discussions among the admin-
istrators, we verified that what we observed from these discussions was consistent
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Type Name
I Indexer
E Experimental
V Verifier
R RSS Crawler
A Analyzer
H Harvester
S Scraper
IRC IRC
Anon Anonymous
U Unknown
Table 3.2: Robot functional types and names
with the actual behavior of the robot. We verified this consistency by ensuring
that the robot came from the same host, requested the same type of resources,
and exhibited similar session characteristics. Based on this analysis, we consider
the following function categories to classify robots.
• Indexer (I) - This is the most general function class of all Web robots.
• Experimental (E) - A robot that is designed primordially for research or
experimental purposes. Research about the origin and background of the
robot points to this classification.
• Verifier (V) - A robot that traverses a site to verify that a Web page does
not contain broken links and that all resources intended to be accessible.
• RSS Crawler (R) - A robot that only retrieves information from the RSS
feeds of a Web site or a blog.
• Harvester (H) - A Web robot that sends HTTP requests for items other
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than HTML documents and their embedded resources. For example, a robot
which sends requests for all music, video, and/or picture files from a Web
page.
• Analyzer (A) - A type of harvester that downloads Web resources only
for analytic, archival, or scientific purposes. Analyzers have documented
functionality and are assumed to use the collected resources in a safe and
predictable manner.
• Scraper (S) - A robot that saves the requested HTML documents. The
term scraper is jargon to describe such robots, as they are commonly used
to automatically create copies of Web sites for malicious purposes.
• IRCBot (IRC) - A robot that connects to an IRC server.
• Anonymous (Anon) - A robot which does not define itself in the user-
agent field of a request. Such robots are intentionally designed to remain
anonymous.
• Unknown (U) - A robot whose function is private, undocumented, or
unknown.
Very often a robot exhibits multiple functions due to which it may be placed
in several classes. For example, an indexer that also saves all jpg files to a cen-
tralized database could be a class I or a class H robot. As a second example,
while an experimental robot performs some analysis on the collected resources,
classifying such a robot both as an experimental (E robot) and an analyzer (A
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robot) makes its primary function ambiguous and open to interpretation. Despite
the analysis that an experimental robot may conduct, it is important to classify
it as an E robot and not an A robot, because an E robot may exhibit ill-behaved
functionality, while A robots are assumed to operate in a well-behaved fashion.
Such a single assignment makes the main functionality of a robot clearer so that
it can become the focus of our analysis. In order to classify each robot into a
single function class, we developed a hierarchy to properly classify multi-function
robots. This hierarchy is structured according to three criteria. Each criterion,
and the order in which it should be applied, is organized so that a robot will
always be placed into a class that is most critical for determining its desirability.
The criteria and their order are as follows:
1. Undocumented functionality: Undocumented robots are intuitively high
risk, as they are likely to be ill-constructed or intentionally undocumented.
2. Specialty: This criteria is important to distinguish robots that are more
specialized than the others. For example, a S robot is also a H robot, but
because a S robot is defined more specifically, those robots fall into this
class.
3. Variety and size of resources: According to this criteria, robots whose
functionality requires them to request multiple types of resources are ranked
higher than those that must request only a singe type of resource. If the
types of resources requested by two function classes are similar then the
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function class that requests resources with sizes that are on an average larger
is ranked higher.
Undocumented or anonymous robots must be identified before others be-
cause these may be extremely hazardous due to their non-deterministic behavior.
The next criterion, specialty, will ensure that a robot will be classified as specifi-
cally as possible, because such precise classification can provide valuable insights
into its desirability. Finally, the size and variety of resources are considered, as
robots whose functions cause them to request unpredictable or large resources
should be highlighted. Using the above guidelines, we order the function classes
into the following hierarchy:
Anon > U > E > A > S > H > R > I > V > IRC
If a robot shows behavior that fits both function classes α and β, and if α > β
then the robot will be classified as α. This hierarchy can be applied naturally to
robots that fit multiple function classes.
Anon and U robots are placed highest in the hierarchy following the first
criterion. E robots can retrieve a large variety of resources of various sizes depend-
ing on the experiment they are designed to run. Because of the unpredictability of
the resources collected and also because the purpose of such experimental robots
may not always be clearly defined, class E is placed just below class U . A robots,
like E, collect a large variety of resources with highly variable sizes depending on
91
the analysis. E > A, however, because a type E robot is a type A robot but uses
the data in a scientific manner that is not always documented, whereas a type A
robot uses the data in a predictable or a standard manner (for example, to collect
aggregate statistics about a Web server for public or private use). Following the
same line of reasoning, class S is placed higher than class H. Class I follows
as a type of a robot that primarily gathers and parses the HTML documents,
retrieves links, and then discards the HTML. As a result, a class I robot requests
predictable resources that are small. Class R precedes class I because an RSS
Crawler acts just like a class I robot but on a smaller, more specialized set of
Web resources. Class V robots are placed accordingly, as they only crawl a site
to verify that no links are broken. Because class V robots should never request
resources other than HTML pages, the average size of the resources they request
is small. Verifiers then use the HEAD HTTP command to verify that links and
resources still exist. IRC robots are at the bottom of the hierarchy, as these
should never appear in a server access log unless an IRC server is also in place.
Anchored around this function class hierarchy, we now present a refined analysis
of the aggregate statistics collected by AWStats.
Percentage of HTTP requests
Figure 3.3 shows the breakdown of the percentage of HTTP requests according
to the function classes. The figure indicates that a large percentage of HTTP
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Fig. 3.3: Percentage of robot HTTP requests per function class
requests are from I robots. This is reasonable as it encompasses all general purpose
indexers (the role most often taken by a Web robot) that do not meet the specific
criteria of an H, S, A, or E robot. Combining the statistics of U and Anon, it is
startling to find that approximately 23% of the HTTP requests are presented by
robots with unknown functionality.
Bandwidth consumption
Figure 3.4 compares the bandwidth consumption of each function class. As ex-
pected, the bandwidth consumption of I robots is the highest, consistent with the
highest percentage of HTTP requests. Surprisingly, the bandwidth consumption
of Anon robots is comparable to H robots, although the percentage of HTTP re-
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quests from H robots is much higher than the percentage of requests from Anon
robots as seen in Figure 3.3. Because Anon robots have non-deterministic behav-
ior, they should be closely inspected to better understand this phenomenon.
Size of requested resources
In Figure 3.5, the average size of the resources requested by robots in each func-
tion class is presented. It can be seen that the average size for classes which
request resources other than HTML pages (A, S, H) is larger than the size of
the resources requested by class I robots, which overwhelmingly request HTML
documents. U robots also request large resources on an average. Since their func-
tion is undocumented or proprietary, and they request a relatively large volume
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of data, it further raises the doubt that robots from class U may be undesirable.
Indexer robots also request resources that are larger than expected. Accord-
ing to Levering et. al., the size and composition of an average HTML document is
25 KB [76], so we expect to see indexers request resources that are approximately
of this size. Since our class of indexers covers a large variety of robots, including
poorly developed and multimedia indexers, however, it is likely that some indexers
also request resources besides HTML pages for analysis. We should also consider
the academic domain of this server, where faculty Web pages are small and simple,
but rife with links to .pdf and .ps documents that are generally much larger than
25 KB.
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In conclusion, we have established how the functional classification can be
used to study the influence of a robot’s function on its crawling properties. This
classification helped us identify the following trends:
• 23% of robots have unknown or undocumented functionality.
• 40% of all robot requests originate from indexers.
• The average size of a requested resource is not estimated by the average size
of an HTML page.
3.3 Resource Classification
The second dimension of classifying Web robots considers their preferences for
the different types of resources. For this classification, we consider a subset of the
resources used in our Web robot detection algorithm, namely:
• Web (web) - Web resources include any Web page stored on the server.
Web resources are requested by all types of robots to learn about the struc-
ture of the site for future crawls. These file types include htm, html, php,
cgi, and shtml.
• Text (txt) - These include Web resources that are encoded in some text-
based format. Such resources may be parsed by Web robots for analysis, or
archived for some purpose. Example file types in this class include txt, xml,
cs, cpp, java, css, m, and robots.txt.
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• Image (img) - These resources comprise image data from a server. Exam-
ples include jpg, eps, ico, bmp, raw, svg, and eps.
• Audio and visual multimedia (av) - These resources include multimedia
data from a Web server, excluding images. Examples include avi, midi, mp3,
wmv, mpg, aif, wav, and rm.
• Document (doc) - These consist of resources that use a formatted docu-
ment file type. These differ from txt resources because they are encoded to
be read by a specific application. Examples include doc, dvi, db, pdf, ps,
and ppt.
• Other (oth) - This class includes resources that do not belong to any one
of the above classes. Blank http requests, file types with no extension,
compressed files, binary files, or extensions not covered above fall into this
class.
It is essential to capture requests to txt, img, doc, and av resources since
these are the traditional targets of Web robots. While web resources also fit the
definition of txt type resources, we include these in a class of their own. If web and
txt resources were combined into one class, it would be infeasible to determine the
frequency of requests for txt and web resources separately. Assessing the frequen-
cies of requests for these two types of resources separately, however, is important
because while all robots request web resources to learn the structure of the site
and to find specific resources, some robots specifically target txt resources and do
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not favor web resources. As an example, the robot Google Feedfetcher requested
2, 358 txt resources but only 20 web resources. This is because Feedfetcher is an
RSS crawler, grabbing xml formatted RSS feeds from the Web server. Resources
in class oth such as binaries, Java class files, files without extension, etc. are useful
to index for search engines and information repositories, however, such resources
cannot be analyzed meaningfully without some context. As a result, identifying
non-indexing robots which regularly request oth types of resources may suggest
ill-behavior and unnecessary resource consumption.
AWStats provides only aggregate resources consumed by the robots, and not
fine-grained information about the specific types of resources requested. There-
fore, we wrote a custom analyzer to process the access log to identify robots
and the specific resources each one requests. The custom analyzer uses the same
database of regular expressions to identify robots as AWStats. For each robot, it
generates a list of all resources requested using the HTTP methods GET, HEAD,
and POST. Using this information, we then extracted the distribution of requests
for each type of resource. We define the metric favoritism index, to quantitatively
determine the degree to which a robot favors each type of resource. The favoritism
index is defined as follows: for a robot R requesting resources of type T , the fa-
voritism index is given by rf (R, T ) = RT/
∑
iRTi , where RT is the number of
requests from robot R for resource type T ,
∑
iRTi is the total number of requests
sent, and
∑
i rf (R, Ti) = 1 for each robot R. The resource type for which rf is
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the highest is considered as the favorite type of resource for the robot.
We compute the favoritism index of each robot for each type of resource.
Using these values, we then group robots according to their highest favoritism
index. For example, robots who have the highest favoritism index for the img
type of resources are placed into the img class. In the sequel, we refer to robots
that favor resource type A, as “A robots”, for example, robots which have the
highest favoritism index for txt type resources are grouped into the txt class and
are referred to as txt robots. Next, we analyze the behavior of Web robots based
on this resource classification scheme.
Resource favoritism across all robots
Table 3.3 shows the favoritism indices for a sample of Web robots, which illustrates
the variety of favoritism indices that robots may exhibit. Grub.org sent requests
for several types of resources, but favored web resources the most. Shim Crawler,
on the other hand, only requested web and txt documents, favoring the latter.
While TencentTraveler and Gaisbot both favor img resources, the degree of fa-
voritism of TencentTraveler is significantly stronger than Ultraseek. Furthermore,
LinkChecker and Checkbot exhibit strong favoritism indices for oth resources. A
robot such as Checkbot, whose favoritism index for oth is 1, may be behaving
suspiciously. By targeting oth resources exclusively, Checkbot raises the suspicion
that it has gained knowledge about the structure of the site through some other
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Robot web txt img doc av oth
Gaisbot 0.3540 0.2795 0.3665 0 0 0
Grub.org 0.8993 0.0158 0.0676 0.0083 0.0023 0.0067
Shim Crawler 0.3333 0.6667 0 0 0 0
TencentTraveler 0.0799 0.0801 0.7955 0.0292 0.0139 0.0011
Ultraseek 0.3855 0.1053 0.0023 0.4776 0.0005 0.0288
LinkChecker 0.0449 0.0449 0 0.0393 0 0.8708
Checkbot 0 0 0 0 0 1
Table 3.3: Favoritism indices for sample robots
means, and is only requesting those resources that traditional robots would not
be able to analyze.
Figure 3.6 shows the distribution of all the robots into different resource
categories. As expected, the web category dominates, since robots need to crawl
HTML pages to find links to their targeted resources. Robots are distributed
relatively uniformly across the remaining resource classes, with the exception of
class av. Our academic SoE server does not host any audio and video files, due
to which there are no robots that favor these types of resources. The distribution
also suggests that our proposed resource classification scheme reasonably models
the behavior of Web robots on this server from the perspective of resource con-
sumption, and distributes robots with high fidelity according to their preferred
types of resources.
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Fig. 3.6: Distribution of robots into resource classes
Resource favoritism by resource class
Next, we compare the favoritism indices of the robots belonging to each resource
class, using the indices of the robots in the img and web categories for illustration.
The favoritism indices for a sample of img robots, given in Table 3.4, suggest that
img robots very strongly prefer image files, as only four robots have a favoritism
index of less than 0.68 for img resources. Furthermore, img robots exhibit very
different favoritism values for the remaining types of resources. This wide variation
could be due to many reasons, including the total number of requests sent, and
the amount of prior information the robots had about the content on the site. If a
robot were to know the location of img files before starting its crawl, it would not
need to send requests for web documents to search for possible links. For example,
84% of the requests from the robot Motor are for image files, and only 5% are
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Robot web txt img doc av oth
Aport 0 0 1 0 0 0
Bloglines 0 0 1 0 0 0
Boris 0.0135 0 0.9864 0 0 0
ConveraMMCrawler 0 0.1600 0.6800 0 0 0.1600
Cursor 0.1071 0.1071 0.7142 0.07142 0 0
Custo 0.0974 0.0720 0.7309 0.09216 0.0063 0.0010
Exabot 0.0791 0.0669 0.8508 0 0 0.0030
HTTTrack 0.2025 0.0498 0.3633 0.3505 0.0115 0.0222
Motor 0.0526 0.0526 0.8421 0.0526 0 0
MSIECrawler 0.1305 0.2975 0.5316 0.0287 0 0.0115
Scooter 0.3746 0.0450 0.5509 0.0062 0.0230 0
Steeler 0.3214 0.1904 0.3928 0.0952 0 0
Sunrise 0 0 1 0 0 0
TencentTraveler 0.0799 0.0801 0.7955 0.0292 0.0139 0.0011
WebCollage 0.2249 0 0.7750 0 0 0
Webdup 0 0.25 0.75 0 0 0
Yahoo-MMCrawler 0.0003 0.004 0.9948 0 0 0.0007
Table 3.4: Favoritism indices for robots in class img
for HTML pages. It is not realistic to overwhelmingly request so many image
files while sending very few requests for web resources without having some offline
knowledge about the structure of the site, or the location of various resources.
Table 3.5 shows the favoritism indices for all types of resources for a sample
of robots in the web resource class. In this class, the values of the index are more
uniformly distributed across the different types of resources compared to the img
class of robots. This is because all robots, regardless of their resource class, must
request web documents in order to find their targeted resources. This hypothesis
is supported by observing that robots in the web class also exhibit comparatively
higher preference for the remaining types of resources in addition to web resources.
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For example, the robots BaiDuSpider and Combine System exhibit a favoritism
index of approximately 0.40 for txt resources. Similarly, Gaisbot’s favoritism in-
dex for txt and img resources is approximately 0.28 and 0.37, respectively. By
comparison, robots in the img resource class show only a mild favoritism for web
resources as seen in Table 3.4.
Table 3.6 reports the mean and the variance of the favoritism index of the
preferred resource type for each resource class. Referring to the table, we ob-
serve that robots belonging to the web class have a mean favoritism index for
web resources of 0.6903. The average favoritism index of oth robots for oth types
of resources is the highest. This means that these robots send requests for oth
resources at a significantly higher rate than the robots in any other resource class.
While it may be reasonable that malfunctioning or ill-designed robots may send
many requests for oth resources, it is against intuition to see robots favoring oth
resources more strongly than well-defined defined robots that are built to request
specific types of resources. One reason for this may be that oth robots may per-
form widely different functions as opposed to robots in the remaining resource
classes.
Since statistics are very similar across web, txt, and doc classes, we conjec-
ture that many robots have offline knowledge about the locations of the resources
they desire before beginning a crawl. Were this not the case, we would have seen
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Robot web txt img doc av oth
Asterias 0.5073 0.1580 0.0006 0.0006 0.3305 0.0030
BaiDuSpider 0.4180 0.3951 0 0.0276 0.0119 0.1474
boitho.com-dc 0.9588 0.0394 0 0 0 0.0018
Combine System 0.5772 0.3960 0 0.0134 0 0.0134
ConveraCrawler 0.7750 0.0156 0.0002 0.1952 0 0.0139
Digger 0.5000 0.5000 0 0 0 0
DoCoMo 0.5517 0.2069 0.1034 0.0517 0 0.0862
EasyDL 0.9677 0 0 0.0323 0 0
Emacs-w3 Search Engine 1.0000 0 0 0 0 0
ExactSeek Crawler 0.6875 0.3125 0 0 0 0
Findlinks 0.5236 0.4764 0 0 0 0
Gaisbot 0.3540 0.2795 0.3665 0 0 0
Geniebot 0.7826 0.2018 0 0.0130 0 0.0026
GetBot 0.5000 0.5000 0 0 0 0
GoForIt.com 0.6250 0.3750 0 0 0 0
Google Sitemaps 0.5117 0.0429 0.0713 0.3193 0.0067 0.0481
Googlebot 1 0 0 0 0 0
Grub.org 0.8993 0.0158 0.0676 0.0083 0.0023 0.0068
OmniExplorer Bot 0.9712 0.0229 0 0.0030 0 0.0029
RoboCrawl Spider 0.8193 0.0390 0.0005 0.0815 0.0305 0.0292
Robozilla 1.0000 0 0 0 0 0
SlySearch 1.0000 0 0 0 0 0
SuperBot 0.6667 0 0 0.3333 0 0
SynooBot 0.6462 0.3538 0 0 0 0
Turn It In 0.5814 0.0374 0.0191 0.3073 0 0.0548
UdmSearch 0.9412 0.0588 0 0 0 0
Voyager 0.8569 0.1383 0.0037 0 0 0.0011
VSE 0.6667 0.3333 0 0 0 0
yacy 0.6134 0.3697 0 0.0168 0 0
Yahoo Feed Seeker 0.5907 0.0694 0.0011 0.3161 0.0022 0.0204
Yahoo Slurp 1.0000 0 0 0 0 0
Yandex bot 0.6016 0.0319 0.0036 0.3422 0.0014 0.0193
Zeus Webster Pro 0.5000 0.5000 0 0 0 0
Fast-Webcrawler 0.5442 0.0195 0.0002 0.4228 0.0020 0.0113
Table 3.5: Sample favoritism indices for robots in class web
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web txt img doc av oth
Mean 0.6903 0.6971 0.7622 0.7147 0 0.7927
Variance 0.2875 0.2959 0.3068 0.2918 0 0.3233
Table 3.6: Mean favoritism index for resource classes
robots favoring web resources with a higher favoritism index compared to the
other resource types, because most robots would need to traverse a great deal of
html pages on a web site to reveal the other resource types hosted.
In summary, classifying Web robots based on the types of resources re-
quested allowed us to observe that:
• About half of all robots favor web resources.
• Robots favoring img resources overwhelmingly prefer them.
• web, txt, and doc robots prefer their favorite resource type similarly.
• Robots favoring oth resources do so more strongly compared to robots in
other resource classifications.
• Robots not heavily favoring web resources are likely to have some pre-
existing knowledge about the structure of the site.
3.4 Characteristic Classification
In the final dimension of our classification scheme, we partition robots according to
the workload characteristics they exhibit on a server. We demonstrate the feasibil-
ity of using K-means clustering for this purpose, by applying it to robots extracted
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from UConn SoE server access logs. K-means is a common algorithm that has
been used to analyze and partition data in many different domains [53,128,43]. We
choose K-means clustering to partition Web robots because of its past successes
in analyzing Web server requests [77,103].
To cluster Web robots, it is necessary to define an appropriate distance met-
ric between data points. The selected metric must factor in the likely correlation
between observations used to characterize robot traffic; for example the volume
of http requests and number of bytes transferred may be correlated [77]. Fur-
thermore, it should also consider that the observations may be measured across
different scales; for example inter-arrival times between requests may be measured
in seconds, and the average number of requests sent per session, could be measured
as a count. We use the Mahalanobis distance, which incorporates both of these
considerations, to cluster robots. The Mahalanobis distance between two feature
vectors vecx and ~y, whose components represent a property of robot traffic, is
defined as:
d(~x, ~y) =
√
(~x− ~y)TΣ−1(~x− ~y)
where Σ is the covariance matrix for all observations and the superscript T
denotes the transpose.
K-means clustering requires that the number of clusters k be selected be-
fore clustering commences. Each application of the algorithm is guaranteed to
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have k clusters, so different values of k will lead to a unique clustering result.
Thus, the value of k governs the quality of clustering, making its selection cru-
cial. Because our objective is to partition Web robots so that all the robots in
a group will display similar crawling characteristics, we consider two important
criteria in selecting the value of k. The first criterion is concerned with minimiz-
ing distance within clusters (intra-cluster distance) while maximizing the distance
between clusters (inter-cluster distance). Intra-cluster distance is defined as the
distance from a vector to the centroid of the cluster to which it is assigned, while
inter-cluster distance is defined as the distance from a vector to another one that
does not belong to its cluster. Intuitively, the best clustering will be one that
maximizes the inter-cluster distance and minimizes the intra-cluster distance. We
measure the first criterion using the silhouette coefficient [113] metric, defined as
follows: let Cˆ = {C1, C2, ...Ck} be the result of a clustering, fully partitioning a
set of data points D. Define the distance of a data point d ∈ D to some cluster
Ci ∈ Cˆ as
dist(d, Ci) =
∑
di∈Ci dm(d, di)
|Ci|
where dm is the distance function between points. Let α(d) = dist(d, C∗i ), d ∈ C∗i
be the distance from d to its assigned cluster C∗i (i.e. measuring intra-cluster
distance) and β(d) = minCi∈Cˆ,Ci 6=C∗i dist(d, Ci) be the distance from d to the
nearest cluster d is not assigned to (i.e. measuring inter-cluster distance). The
silhouette of d is defined as:
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φ(d) =
β(d)− α(d)
max(β(d), α(d))
.
φ(d) will approach −1 as the inter-cluster distance decreases and intra-
cluster distance increases, and will approach 1 in the mirroring case. Thus, the
closer φ(d) is to 1, the better the cluster assignment for d is. The silhouette
coefficient of a clustering is simply the average value of the measure for each data
point d:
SCCˆ =
∑
d∈D φ(d)
|D|
Previous studies suggest that values of SCCˆ greater than 0.7 achieve su-
perior separation between clusters, while maintaining data points close to their
assigned cluster centroid [70]. Values between 0.5 and 0.7 are also acceptable,
indicating that the data points are sufficiently close to their cluster centroid while
still maintaining separation between other clusters.
The second criteria is the degree to which robots are evenly distributed
into k clusters. An even distribution will provide precise insights into the traffic
characteristics of robots by clear differentiation. In contrast, lumping a majority
robots into few clusters will lead to general conclusions without any distinctive
insights. To measure our second criterion we consider the size of each cluster.
In a desirable distribution of robots into clusters, the variance in the size of the
clusters must be low, signifying that the robots are not overly concentrated into
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a single cluster.
We examined both the measures because a high value of SCCˆ does not imply
that the cluster size variance will low. A superior choice for k, for example, may
be one where its value of SCcˆ is within an acceptable range and its cluster size
variance is smallest. Once the data are partitioned into k clusters, each cluster
is given a unique label Ca,b,..., where each subscript is assigned an integer value
according to the rank of the cluster’s centroid position in nondecreasing order for
each respective traffic feature. This cluster labeling allows the scheme to be easily
expandable to consider any number of data features.
To apply this classification, we extracted three different properties of Web
robot traffic: (i) volume of HTTP requests sent, (ii) volume of bandwidth con-
sumed, and (iii) average size of resources requested. We analyzed the three metrics
in a pairwise fashion over the entire set of robots to explore the correlations be-
tween them. Figures 3.7(a) through Figure 3.7(c) show the results of the pairwise
analyses of these metrics. In each figure, the top plot includes all data points, while
the bottom one focuses in on the most concentrated region to offer a better sense
of the data distribution. Figure 3.7(c) shows a positive linear relationship between
bandwidth consumed and volume of http requests, with the correlation coefficient
measured at 0.804. This observation matches with previous results suggesting a
strong linear correlation between request volume and bandwidth consumption for
all server traffic [77]. On the contrary, the average size of requested resources
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exhibits no observable relationship with both the request volume and bandwidth
consumption (Figures 3.7(a) and (b)), with correlations of 0.035 and −0.004 re-
spectively. These observations thus dispute the belief that a robot, which on
average requests very large resources, will also consume a considerable bandwidth
or will send a large number of http requests.
The top plots in all the figures indicate that some robots place dispropor-
tionate strain on the Web server. Although it is common to filter such outliers
before applying clustering, we chose to include them because it is important to
understand the traffic from these robots that disproportionately consume server
resources from the point of view of server preparation.
Cluster analysis
We performed K-means clustering with the three metrics for each of the 169 robots.
We chose these three metrics to illustrate the feasibility of using clustering to
partition Web robots; in practice any number of additional traffic metrics could
be used to generate a higher-dimensional clustering. The clustering algorithm
was implemented in MATLAB, and verified using several manually-generated test
sets that contained clear groupings of the data points. In this section, we first
discuss our analysis to select the appropriate number of clusters. Subsequently,
we comment on the quality and characteristics of the clusters and the important
insights they provide into robot traffic.
110
(a) Avg. Request Size (b) Avg. Bandwidth
(c) Request Volume
Fig. 3.7: Pair-wise comparison of robot traffic characteristics
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Fig. 3.8: Silhouette coefficients for each k-clustering
To select an appropriate number of clusters that maximizes the silhouette
coefficient and minimizes the variance in cluster size, we performed K-means clus-
tering with randomly selected initial centroids for k ranging from 2 to 12. We
limited the maximum number of clusters to 12 due to the small number of robots.
Figure 3.8 plots the value of SCCˆ as a function of k. While k = 2, 3, and
4 show very high values of SCCˆ , using so few clusters would offer little insights
since this would not appropriately classify the outliers across any metric into its
own group. A noticeable dip in the measure is seen when k = 5, followed by a
steady increase until another peak at k = 7 where SCCˆ = 0.7038. For 7 ≤ k ≤ 11,
the levels of the silhouette coefficient indicate a good tradeoff between inter and
intra-cluster distances.
Figure 3.9 charts the variance in cluster size for the same range of k. When
k = 12 the variance in size of each cluster is smallest, however, the respective
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value of SCCˆ drops significantly. For 7 ≤ k ≤ 11, the variance in cluster size is
small and does not drop significantly as k increases. Recognizing a peak in the
value of SCCˆ and relatively low variance for k = 10, we choose to partition these
robots into 10 clusters.
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Fig. 3.9: Variance of size of each cluster for each k-clustering
Cluster Characteristics
Table 3.7 shows the average values of each metric or the coordinates of the centroid
for each cluster. The clusters are assigned a label Ca,b,c where a, b and c represent
the cluster rank based on request volume, bandwidth consumption, and average
size of requested resource respectively. Figure 3.10 presents a three-dimensional
plot of the positions of cluster centroids, with a log scale for request volume and
bandwidth, and a linear scale for the average requested resource size. The figure
shows that the centroids are positioned along the request volume and bandwidth
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Fig. 3.10: Centroid positions for each cluster
axis according to the positive linear correlation observed between these metrics.
The centroid positions along the average requested resource size axis, however, are
concentrated because robots tend to request very small resources on average [30].
This is especially true for this academic Web server, which is likely to host a large
collection of small files.
Table 3.7 also defines size and the boundaries for each cluster across the
three metrics. The table reveals that over 63% robots fall into cluster C2,1,1,
whose label suggests that this group of robots request a relatively small volume
of http requests, consume little bandwidth and request the smallest resources on
average. The membership of this cluster is significantly high due to the presence
of outliers, which are forced into their own cluster (for example, C4,7,10 and C1,3,9).
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Because these outliers cannot be ignored, we can accommodate them by refining
very large partitions through repeating the clustering only over robots in these
partitions. This will produce a hierarchical structure of clusters where the highest-
level ones deliver a broad classification of Web robots while lower-level clusters
refine a broad class into a series of more specific ones. For example, Table 3.7
suggests that robots in C2,1,1 exert low demands on the server. Furthermore, this
large C2,1,1 cluster also contains robots that do not retrieve any resources. Thus,
it may be desirable to partition this cluster further to isolate such “no-demand”
robots into their own class. Such refinement of clusters can classify robots at any
desired level of granularity.
Since robots in this cluster consume relatively fewer resources, they most
likely reflect traffic that does not impose significant strain on the server. The
difference in the bounds along each metric is also small, which also indicates
that robots in this cluster are heavily concentrated. By comparison, clusters of
high-demand robots such as C7,8,7, C9,9,5, and C10,10,4 are very wide and have few
members. The few robots in this cluster show extraordinary characteristics, and
hence, should be examined more closely to determine if their purpose is in the
best interests of the Web server. If the investigation reveals that these robots are
from commercial services that provide no benefit to UConn SoE for example, they
should be blocked from access.
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Req. Volume Bytes Transferred (MB) Avg. Req. Size (MB)
min max avg min max avg min max avg
C9,9,5 2.3E5 2.9E5 2.6E5 3.2E4 4.7E4 3.9E4 .142 .160 .151
C5,4,6 2 15,559 2,103 .301 2,043 335.9 .088 .283 .154
C3,2,8 1 5,329 634.6 .345 1,794 234 .307 .708 .447
C2,1,1 1 4,351 339.8 0 99.7 5.91 0 .072 .014
C10,10,4 8.2E5 1.1E6 9.3E5 1,534 1.7E5 8.6E4 .002 .163 .082
C7,8,7 2.0E4 6.2E4 4.3E4 4,341 4.2E4 8,681 .171 .243 .206
C6,5,3 8,347 3.2E4 1.8E4 .386 2,461 818.8 4.3E-5 .091 .036
C4,7,10 717 717 717 3,466 3,466 3,466 4.83 4.83 4.83
C8,6,2 3.9E4 7.0E4 5.8E4 182 4,928 1,956 .003 .071 .032
C1,3,9 126 402 264 131.2 523.4 327.3 1.04 1.30 1.17
Table 3.7: Robot cluster statistics
3.5 Related Research
A number of efforts have studied the traffic characteristics of Web robots with an
eye towards detecting such robots. Stassopoulou et. al. [108] employ a detection
framework based on a Bayesian network, while Tan et. al. [112] perform detection
based on the navigational patterns of Web robots. Through a more extensive
study of robot traffic, focusing on crawlers that belong to five well-known search
engines, Dikaiakos et al. [30] gain insights into their crawler behavior as a means
for separating human users from robots in access logs.
The above efforts consider aggregate properties of robot traffic. In contrast,
the research described in this paper applies data clustering to classify Web robots
to gain a more detailed understanding of their specific traffic patterns. This
exercise is necessary because modern sophisticated Web robots exhibit a wide
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variety of functionality and visiting intentions, leading to a significant disparity in
their crawling behaviors and demands [31]. A detailed study can form the basis
of a scheme to detect and block ill-behaved robots. It can also lead to analytical
models of robot workloads, which could be used to assess server performance.
3.6 Chapter Summary
This chapter presented a novel classification framework to understand and analyze
the behavior of Web robots along multiple, orthogonal perspectives. The frame-
work allows us to assign a multi-dimensional classification to a robot based on
their functionality, the types of resources they prefer, and on the characteristics
of their workload on a Web server. Using robots’ classifications as a basis, we
made the following observations about robot traffic:
• Over 23% of robots have unknown or undocumented functionality.
• 40% of HTTP requests from robots are from indexers.
• The average size of resources requested by indexing robots is not accurately
estimated by the average size of HTML pages.
• 50% of robots favored web resources, while the robots from other resource
classes do not favor web resources strongly.
• A robot that does not heavily favor web resources may have some pre-existing
knowledge about the structure of the site before starting its crawl.
• Robots belonging to the img class overwhelmingly prefer img resources.
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• The expected favoritism index of a robot’s favorite resource type is nearly
similar for web, txt, and doc robots.
• Robots which prefer oth resources do so with a higher average degree than
any other resource class.
• Robots are best partitioned into 10 different characteristic classes. In other
words, robots impose a wide range of demands on a Web server.
• Over 63% of robots request a small voume of resources, consume little band-
width, and request small resources on average.
• 10% of robots visiting the UConn SoE Web server fall into clusters that
represent disproportionately intense demands on a Web server.
Chapter 4
Workload Analysis
The behavioral, statistical, and workload properties of human-induced traffic on
the Web are now well understand [7,57,77,26,6,54,127]. This understanding has
led to the development of essential Web server optimizations [81], traffic gen-
erators [22,118,14], and models that forecast the workload of traffic on a Web
server [61]. Since the present levels of robot traffic on the Internet is now substan-
tial [109,60,30], and since our classification scheme revealed how robots implement
advanced functionality [5,97] and exhibit widely varying behaviors [31,59,33,66],
it is now important that we establish a similarly deep and thorough understand-
ing of their traffic as well. It is unlikely that our understanding of human traffic
will transcend to Web robots because the autonomous way in which Web robots
send requests to retrieve information off a site stands in sharp contrast to the
way humans browse a Web site. For example, a robot may send requests at a
constant request rate to retrieve all the resources at a site, and then performs
processing to extract knowledge after the fact. Human-induced traffic, however,
is much more deliberate. A human visits a site with the goal of finding specific
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knowledge, and analyzes the structure and data on a page to find the information
desired. Furthermore, the traffic properties of humans are induced by the char-
acteristics of a Web browser. These Web browsers quickly send requests for all
embedded resources on an html page, causing human traffic to be bursty. Robots,
however, may send requests at any time and at any rate. Consequently, due to
the differences between humans and robots, we hypothesize that there must exist
contrasts and distinctions in the statistical characteristics of human and robot-
induced requests.
In this chapter, we throughly examine whether or not Web robot traffic
exhibits two important statistical characteristics: (i) power-tails in their response
sizes, interarrival times, session request volume, and intersession times; and (ii)
long-range dependence in the arrival process of their traffic. These two charac-
teristics are investigated in robot traffic across Web servers from three separate
domains, namely, academic, research, and e-commerce, to promote the breadth of
conclusions. In our search for power-tails, we use a unique multi-faceted analysis
which suggests that only interarrival and inter-session Web robot request times
are power-tailed whereas request volume and response sizes are not power-tailed.
Furthermore, we find that robot traffic does exhibit long-range dependence in their
arrival process, similar to humans. Our discussion following this analysis explains
how the behavior of Web robots may give rise to non power-tailed trends, and
discusses the implications of our findings on current policies and optimizations
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employed by Web servers expecting power-tailed traffic. We also present how our
analysis suggests that, unlike human traffic, the long-range dependence of robot
traffic depends on the inter-arrival time distribution of their requests1.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.1 motivates the selection of
the three Web servers through a preliminary analysis of their logs. Section 4.2
gives a brief primer on power-tailed distributions. Section 4.3 searches for power-
tails in Web robot traffic through our unique, multi-faceted analysis. Section 4.4
analysis long-range dependence in the arrival process of Web robots. We review
the related work in Section 4.5 and conclude the chapter in Section 4.6.
4.1 Preliminary Analysis
We analyze robot traffic from Web servers across three different domains over the
same outage-free, seven-week period in 2009. In this section, we discuss how the
domains represented by these three servers are diverse because of their services,
types of Web applications, and the traffic trends observed on them. Examining
Web robot traffic across these three assorted servers will thus provide a perspective
that cannot be obtained through the analysis on a single server.
• (Academic) UConn SoE Web server. This server hosts an informational
Web site that provides information about the school, the departments and
faculty. The Web server also hosts all faculty, laboratory, course, and student
1Portions of this chapter were previously written and published by the author in [35,37,38].
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Web pages.
• (E-commerce) UConn Co-op Web server. This server hosts an e-commerce
store to purchase UConn branded merchandise and books. The store is
powered by a Web application that allows users to browse for products
without logging in. After being authenticated, the users can also purchase
the merchandise.
• (Research) Roper Center for Public Opinion Research Web server. This
server hosts an online database of public opinion polling questions and re-
sponses. A small amount of data can be accessed on informational pages
through the site without registration, but the majority of polls, responses,
and datasets can only be accessed through a Web application that requires
registration. Users are granted automatic access if their ip address lies in a
white-list of pre-authenticated addresses. This gives robots an opportunity
to collect data that is only accessible through the Web application.
The primary purpose of the SoE server is to provide information; the few
pages that require authentication are included for administrative tasks and are
hidden from casual visitors. The primary purpose of the Co-op server is to facili-
tate online commerce and hence it hosts a Web application that supports functions
such as browsing catalogs, adding items to a cart, and registering personal infor-
mation in a secure database. The e-commerce server does not host any pages that
can be considered as providing information in the same vein as the SoE server.
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Finally, the Roper Center server combines the functions of both an academic and
e-commerce server, because it hosts informational pages as well as an online Web
application to acquire public opinion research data.
The logs on each server contain an entry for every http request that it re-
ceives. We pre-processed these entries to extract the requested resource, its size,
the time of the request, the http response code, and the sender’s user-agent field.
From this pre-processed data, we obtained a sample of Web robot requests by
comparing the user-agent field against a database of regular expressions repre-
senting well-known Web robots. The regular expressions in this database were
collected from AWStats, a popular open source log analysis tool [9]. Although
the previous chapter proposed an advanced approach for extracting robot traffic
from a Web log [36,34,51,108], this simple approach is sufficient to obtain a large
enough sample of Web robots to allow for statistical examination of heavy-tailed
trends and long range dependence.
The preliminary summary of robot activity on each Web server is shown
in Table 4.1, illustrating the large number of robot requests (at least 80,000 per
server) collected during the seven week period across all three Web servers leaves
us with a sufficient amount of data to perform a meaningful statistical analysis.
We further explore the noteworthy distinctions in the profiles of robot traffic faced
by each server next.
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Characteristic Web Server Aggregate Human Traffic
Robot Traffic
(lower bound)
Coop 4,586,201 4,439,685 (96.8%) 146,516 (3.2%)
Total Requests Roper Center 1,400,073 1,317,175 (93.8%) 82,898 (6.2%)
SoE 1,087,826 947,524 (87.1%) 140,302 (12.9%)
Coop 95,545 92,493 3,052
Avg. Req/day Roper Center 29,369 27,912 1,457
SoE 22,663 19,740 2,923
Coop 24.22 20.65 (85.3%) 3.57 (14.7%)
Bandwidth (GB) Roper Center 15.32 12.27 (80.1%) 3.06 (19.9%)
SoE 81.84 66.30 (81.0%) 15.55 (19.0%)
Coop 0.50 0.43 0.07
Avg. GB/day Roper Center 0.32 0.26 0.06
SoE 1.71 1.38 0.33
Coop 5,014 4,980 (99.3%) 2,555 (51.0%)
Unique Requests Roper Center 69,213 64,396 (93%) 5,744 (8.3%)
SoE 74,061 34,516 (46.6%) 58,115 (78.5%)
Table 4.1: Summary statistics of Web logs
4.1.1 Request volume
The proportion of requests from Web robots is the largest on the SoE server.
We note that volumes reported in Table 4.1 are a lower bound on the actual
volume of robot traffic, which may be much higher. The proportion of requests
to the SoE Web server is twice as large as the proportion to the Roper server,
which in itself is twice as large as the proportion to the Co-op server. The SoE
server may be faced with the highest proportion of robot requests because robots
visit this site frequently to stay abreast of the information updates. The Roper
server sees an intermediate proportion of robot requests because it still serves
some information, however, this information is updated only intermittently and
remains fairly static. This information is also highly specialized compared to
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the information available throughout the SoE Web server, which drives down the
number of robots interested in crawling the server. Only the information avaialble
through registration is updated frequently, but so few robots may have access to
this that they do not appreciably increase the total number of requests sent. The
very small proportion of Web traffic to the Coop site is due to its tremendous
popularity by human visitors that made over 4 million requests during the seven
week period. Besides traditional search engine indexers and Website scrapers,
shopbots also visit the catalog to collect pricing data, or to browse the online
catalog to collect metadata about products for price comparison Web sites and
search engines.
4.1.2 Bandwidth
Nearly one-fifth of all data transferred to clients are sent to Web robots on the SoE
and Roper Center servers, Furthermore, the total bandwidth consumed by robots
on the SoE server is five times higher than the Roper Center, which may be due
to the many different kinds of files the SoE Web server hosts, from images, videos,
and faculty research papers, to massive datasets and compressed executables. In
contrast, the Roper Center primarily has smaller html pages, images, and RSS
feeds accessible throughout their Web site. The Coop has the lowest proportion
of data sent to robots, due to its higher popularity. However, the total size of
resources requested to robots fall between the Roper Center and the SoE Web
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servers. The Coop serves more images, text, and embedded html files than the
Roper Center to support its Web application, but the variations in file types and
sizes are much smaller.
4.1.3 Unique requests
The total number of unique requests for distinct resources is a reflection of the
accessibility of the data available on each Web server. Nearly all files hosted on
the SoE Web server is available without the need to perform any authentication.
Thus, robots were able to harvest nearly 80% of all files that are available on the
server. The Coop e-commerce Web application is more restrictive. Robots can
browse the entire site catalog, but is unable to reach shopping cart, registration,
payment, and shipping pages without first logging into the site, which constitutes
approximately half of all hosted files. Finally, almost all of the available data on
the Roper Center Web server is located within its hosted Web application that
requires an account to access.
Our preliminary analysis suggests that all three Web servers, representing different
domains of the Internet and hosting different kinds of Web sites and applications,
are faced with traffic that has distinct patterns. By analyzing robot traffic across
these diverse Web servers, we will be able to identify statistical characteristics of
their traffic which is invariant to its domain, to the services it provides, and to
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the profile of traffic that they face.
4.2 Power-tailed distributions: An Overview
A distribution F (x) is said to be heavy-tailed its reliability function R(x) = 1 −
F (x) drops at a rate that is slower than exponential [80], that is,
lim
x→∞
esxR(x) =∞
for all s > 0. Power-tailed distributions are a strict subset of the set of heavy
tailed distributions [80]. where the reliability function also satisfies the property:
R(x) ∼ cx−α
where c is a constant and α is the scaling parameter, defining the rate at which
the reliability function goes to zero. As α decreases, an increasingly larger portion
of the probability mass is present in the right tail. While it still holds that
limx→∞ Pr[X > x] = 0, the probability of witnessing extremely large values does
not drop at least exponentially fast in contrast to more common distributions such
as the Normal, the Poisson, and the Exponential [80]. We note that many legacy
Web traffic studies use the term heavy-tail when they actually are referring to
power-tailed behavior [27,40,6,30,77].
The defining characteristic of power-tailed distributions is that they exhibit
infinite moments. This can be seen by noting that the probability density function
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corresponding to F (x) is
f(x) = −dR(x)
dx
=
cα
xα+1
so its moments are given by
E[X l] =
∫ ∞
0
xl
cα
xα+1
dx
which when l > α evaluates to
E[X l] = A(z) + cα
∫ ∞
z
xl−α−1dx =∞
where z is the value of x where the power-tailed behavior begins, and A(z) is the
value of the integral from 0 to z. For example, if α < 2, E[X2] =∞, so X has an
infinite variance. This indicates that no matter how long we sample X, there will
always be an event larger than what our data captures. The large events, however,
are at least balanced by all the small events between the large ones (in the sense
that from a sample of n data points, the sample mean x¯ → E[X] as n → ∞) .
If α < 1 however, E[X] = ∞, so the sample mean x¯ diverges as n → ∞. Thus,
empirical measurements of a power-tailed phenomenon where α < 2, provides
limited insights because many sample statistics do not converge.
Power-tailed characteristics in the size or volume of resource requests have
critical implications for computing systems that serve a large number of requests.
Such systems must be specifically designed to handle the occasional extreme heavy
load that will inevitably arise to maintain high availability and performance [8].
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Thus, researchers have devoted significant effort to check for power-tailed trends
in the traffic on the Web, which is a massively distributed system that is comprised
of servers serving millions of requests.
4.2.1 Common power-tailed distributions
Our analysis of Web robot traffic looks for fits between empirical distributions
and three theoretical distributions, namely the Pareto, Weibull, and Lognormal
distributions. This section we briefly reviews these distributions and discusses
their application in the analysis of Web traffic.
Pareto distribution
The Pareto distribution is power-tailed over its entire range [80]. The probability
density function takes a shape parameter α and location parameter k. It is given
by:
pt(x) =
αθα
xα+1
for α, θ > 0 and x ≥ θ.
The Pareto distribution has been used to model the size of Web server re-
sponses to humans that are greater than a certain threshold θ. Such a model is
supported due to the fact that the sizes of resources available on a Web server fol-
low a Pareto distribution [27]. Probabilistic analysis that predict Pareto response
sizes from a Web server offer further support [88].
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Weibull distribution
The Weibull distribution has a pdf given by:
f(x, k, θ) =
k
θ
(
x
θ
)k−1e−(x/θ)
k
where k is a scaling parameter [80]. When k < 1, the Weibull is power-tailed.
The Weibull is traditionally used by reliability engineers to model the probabilities
of failure. In the context of Web traffic, we can model the interarrival times of
requests to a server according to the an analogy with reliability modeling: we can
say that a request made to a Web server is a “failure” event. Like many reliability
models, the time between requests (failures) is likely to be very small during an
active session (burn-in period), but the longer it has been since a client sent a
request (failure event), the less likely it is that we will observe a request (failure)
in the future.
Lognormal distribution
If Y = lnX be a random variable that is normally distributed. we say that X
follows a lognormal distribution, with probability density given by:
logn(x) =
1√
2piσx
e−(lnx−µ)
2/2σ2
where µ and σ are the mean and standard deviation of the normal distribution
that Y follows. Note that although the Lognormal distribution obeys the limit
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definition of heavy-tailed distributions based on the limit definition, it is not
power-tailed because all of its moments are finite.
4.2.2 Verifying power-tails
In many studies of physical and economic phenomena [11,25], the method used to
identify a power tail consists of a visual inspection of R(x) plotted on a log-log
scale and identifying a linear trend with slope −α. This linear trend emerges
because logR(x) = log c−α log x, and its derivative with respect to log x is equal
to −α. Because the physical and economic data sets very strictly exhibit this
straight line behavior with values of α < 2 [11], it can be visually ascertained
whether the data is power-tailed or not.
Web traffic data seldom exhibits the precise power-tailed behavior that many
natural phenomena follow. This can lead to many difficulties in asserting that
a data set follows a power-tailed distribution. For example, a data set that is
Lognormally distributed with a very large variance will show a linear trend over
a range of values in a plot of its reliability on the log-log scale. This can be seen
by taking the natural log of logn(x):
ln logn(x) = − lnx− ln
√
2piσ − (lnx− µ)
2
2σ2
When σ2 → ∞, the quadratic term drops to 0, leaving a linear function. As
visual fits can be inconclusive, researchers have proposed a variety of techniques
for verifying the existence of power tails in empirical data [123,119,40,39]. For
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our study of robot traffic, in addition to a visual analysis of the best fitting power
tailed distributions to empirical data, we consider two statistical tests and look
for a consensus among these tests. These tests include the Hill estimator and
Vuong’s distribution comparison test.
Hill estimator
The Hill estimator [123] is commonly used to estimate α for a power-tailed distri-
bution because its estimation procedure starts at the far right tail of an empirical
data set and then works backwards, mitigating the impact that small values, which
do not contribute to the power-tailed trend, have on the estimation. It is defined
as follows: let x1, x2, ..., xn denote the data set generated by the random variable
X and x(1) ≥ x(2) ≥ ... ≥ x(n) be the order statistics of the data. Using k < n of
the order statistics, the Hill estimator of α is given by:
αˆk = (
1
k
k∑
i=1
log
x(i)
x(k+1)
)−1
The change in the estimator αˆk over values of k is then plotted up to ks, the
order statistic that represents the start of the power tail. For small values of k the
plot will be very noisy, but should gradually stabilize as k increases and a larger
portion of the power tail is considered. If a power tail exists, the Hill estimator
should stabilize to 0 ≤ α < 2 as k approaches ks on the Hill plot.
For our Web robot data sets, we construct plots of the Hill estimator to
check whether α stabilizes. We consider all possible starting positions by varying
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k across the entire range of the order statistics. In this plot, a power tail would
be presented as a range of values for which α is stable, before varying more
significantly as the smallest values in the data set are considered. The plots also
include bands representing a 95% confidence interval for the estimates [20].
Distribution comparison
Comparing how well an empirical distribution fits against a theoretical one is
a routine procedure when characterizing trends in a dataset. These distribution
comparison methods are typically driven by a goodness-of-fit test where a distance
from an empirical distribution to a theoretical one is computed and the significance
of this distance is assessed by a test statistic. For example, the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov (KS) test is based on the largest difference between the values of an
empirical and theoretical distribution across their supports [78]. In the context of
Web traffic, however, goodness-of-fit tests are very likely to reject the hypothesis
that the data is power-tailed for two reasons. First, because Web data seldom
precisely follows a theoretical distribution, the tail behavior of the data set will
exhibit a high degree of variability. Second, a goodness-of-fit statistic can be
distorted by the right tail of sampled power-tailed data, which we define as the
m largest samples drawn out of n. This can be seen on a log-log scale of such
power-tailed data, where the extreme right tail of the reliability function consists
of a sparse number of points that can deviate from the linear trend [80].
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To avoid the pitfalls of goodness-of-fit tests, we instead use a likelihood ratio
test to statistically determine if the data follows a power-tailed distribution. We
first compute the likelihood that the data follows either a Pareto or Weibull dis-
tributions, which are power-tailed, and test these fits against the non-power-tailed
Lognormal distribution fit. Vuong’s statistic [119] allows us to test whether one
model has a significantly better fit to another model derived from a different prob-
ability distribution. It tests the hypothesis that both models equivalently describe
the empirical data, against the alternative hypothesis that one of the models offers
a superior fit. Let f(X|Θˆ) be one possible model of the data X fitted by param-
eters estimated through the maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) technique Θˆ,
and g(X|Ψˆ) be an alternative model of X fitted with the MLE parameters Ψˆ.
Further, define:
LR(Θˆ, Ψˆ) =
n∑
i=1
log
f(xi|Θˆ)
g(xi|Ψˆ)
as the log-likelihood ratio between the models f and g. Vuong showed that when
f and g are not nested, under the null hypothesis H0 : f(X|Θˆ) = g(X|Ψˆ):
Vd =
LR(Θˆ, Ψˆ)√
nσˆn
∼ N (0, 1)
where:
σˆ2n =
1
n
n∑
i=1
(log
f(xi|Θˆ)
g(xi|Ψˆ)
)2 − ( 1
n
n∑
i=1
log
f(xi|Θˆ)
g(xi|Ψˆ)
)2
The test considers the alternative hypotheses Hf : f better describes the data, and
Hg : g better describes the data. Under Hf , Vd
a.s.−−→ ∞, while under HG, Vd a.s.−−→
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−∞. Thus, we only need to select a critical value c from the standard normal
distribution corresponding to the level of significance desired. By symmetry of
the standard normal, we can perform the following two-sided significance test:
if Vd > c, reject H0 in favor of Hf , or if Vd < −c, reject H0 in favor of Hg.
Otherwise, do not reject H0. We test Vd at the 95% confidence level, corresponding
to c = 1.960.
Because the Weibull and Pareto exhibit a distinctly different behavior in its
tail compared to the Lognormal distribution, we plot Vd for subsets of the order
statistics, from x(1) to x(m), while varying m. In all of our tests, we select f as
the Lognormal and g as either the power-tailed Pareto or Weibull distributions.
From this construction, we would expect that Vd > c when empirical data does
not favor one of the power-tailed distributions. If the data is power-tailed, how-
ever, Vd should be negative and then exhibit a decreasing trend as we exclude
a more significant proportion of the largest points in the data set. It must be
emphasized that the results of the Vuong test do not imply that the data truly
follows a Lognormal, Pareto, or a Weibull distribution. Rather, we interpret the
results as a suggestion about whether the data more strongly exhibits power- or
non-power-tailed characteristics. This suggestion can then be considered along
with information from the reliability function plot and the Hill estimator to infer
whether the data exhibits a power-tailed trend.
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In our study, we use both the Hill estimator and Vuong’s test statistic to analyze
whether a power tail is present. The Hill estimator provides a precise view of the
power-tailed nature of the distribution, in that we are able to identify how α, the
main parameter that characterizes power-tailed behavior, changes as we consider
more points from the right-tail of the distribution. The information provided
by Vuong’s test offers a more global view in that it considers the entire body
of the distribution and only a portion of its right-tail These macro and micro
level examinations of power tailed behavior help to improve the fidelity of our
conclusions.
4.3 Power-tails in Web Robot Traffic
Because many properties of human Web traffic exhibit power-tailed trends [26,6,54],
a natural question is whether robot traffic also exhibits such trends. If robot
traffic does not exhibit power-tailed characteristics like humans, it would sug-
gest the need to re-evaluate the practical implications of power-tailed behavior
on Web server optimizations. In this section, we thoroughly examine whether
the traffic induced by Web robots exhibits power-tailed characteristics similar to
human-induced traffic. We compare human and robot traffic using two session-
level (response size and number of requests per session) and temporal-level (in-
terarrival and intersession times) metrics that critically influence the performance
of Web servers [8,27,14,13]. Our multi-faceted analysis approach takes readings
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from several different that helps us convincingly conclude whether these features
of robot traffic are power-tailed. In this section, we first provide an overview of
power-tailed data along with a discussion of the commonly used distributions for
modeling power-tailed trends. We then introduce the statistical tests used our
multi-faceted analysis.
This section examines whether or not power-tailed trends exist in robot
traffic across each of the three servers presented in Section 4.1. To consider both
session and temporal features, we further separated the requests into sessions by
identifying time lapses of at least 30 minutes between consecutive requests from
the same IP address and user-agent field [86]. We consider traffic characteristics
representing request-level and session-level features. Features at both levels are
considered because request-level features are related to the arrival process of re-
quests, while session-level features are associated with the activity that occurs
within a session. The emergence of power-tails at both levels have been studied
extensively in the literature for human traffic and in a limited fashion for Web
robots [30]. For each level, we choose two characteristics that are extensively
relied on in modeling Web server performance [81] and for Web traffic gener-
ation [22,118,14]. At the request-level, we examine interarrival and intersession
times, and at the session-level we consider response size and the volume of requests
sent per session.
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Fig. 4.1: Response sizes: distribution fits
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Fig. 4.2: Response sizes: Hill estimates
4.3.1 Response size
The response size is defined as the size of a resource that was requested and
does not include the size of headers, flags, checksums, or any other information
sent within an http response packet. The distribution of response sizes for each
of the three Web servers, along with the best fitting Lognormal, Weibull, and
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Fig. 4.3: Response sizes: Vuong statistics
Pareto distributions, is given in Figure 4.12. At a first glance both the Coop
and SoE servers show a linear trend that is indicative of power-tailed behavior.
On the Coop server, the linear drop begins suddenly at approximately 10KB,
however the far right tail is distorted by the few requests that have very large
response sizes. The response sizes on the Coop server appear to fit the Pareto
distribution (α = 3.85) well, except for values at the extreme right tail that
causes θ (the value at which the distribution begins to be fitted to the data)
2 To properly fit a Pareto distribution, θ must be estimated first, and then the the best
fitting value of α only for points larger than θ should be used. Clauset et al. proposes that
θ be selected so that the probability distribution of the data and of the best fitting Pareto
distribution be as close as possible for all x > θ [23]. In this study, whenever we fit a Pareto
distribution to empirical data, we do so only for values larger than θˆ, an estimate of θ that
minimizes the Kolmogorov-Smirnov goodness-of-fit statistic between the CDF of the data and
of the best fitting Pareto distribution for x > θˆ. Specifically, if F (x) is the CDF of the data and
P (x) is a Pareto distribution fitted to the data, θ is given as:
θ = min
θˆ
max
x>θˆ
|F (x)− P (x)|
While the Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistical test is extremely sensitive to small deviations in a
power tail, the value of the test statistic will still be minimized for the best fitting theoretical
model and is suitable to find a minimum θ.
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to be inaccurate. Response sizes on the Roper Center, with its straight-lined
left tail, convex body, and exponentially decreasing right tail, are dissimilar to
the three fitted distributions. Finally, the SoE server distribution experiences
an increasing rate of decay approaching its tail that matches the shape of the
Lognormal distribution.
Figure 4.2 plots the Hill estimator of α. The x-axis corresponds to the
number of largest order statistics used in the distribution and ranges and starts
at k = 15. To make the computation of these hill plots feasible, we note that
the estimate was not computed only for values of m where the value of the order
statistic changed. This causes the Hill plots to appear “jaggy”, particularly for
large values of k. However, since we seek to merely find a a stable trend in the
Hill estimator and not find a precise estimate of α, this effect does not impact
our analysis. For response sizes on the Coop, the Hill plot (Figure 4.2a) is very
noisy as it takes over 50,000 out of 146,516 order statistics to be considered before
the estimate begins to stabilize at approximately α = 3.9. While this estimate
matches the MLE of the Pareto fit, the amount of noise across such a remarkable
number of points indicates that if a power-tailed trend existed, it would be unsta-
ble over a very large range. This forces us to reassess whether the linear trend in
Figure 4.1a is consistent enough to consider it as a power-tail. The Roper Center
and SoE Hill plots do not identify a stable value for α, supporting the hypothesis
that a power tail does not exist.
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In Figure 4.3, Vuong’s statistic is used to compare the Lognormal against
the Pareto and Weibull fits. The straight dotted lines in the figures represent the
threshold where we reject the hypothesis that both the Lognormal and one of the
power-tailed distributions adequately describe the data in favor of the Lognormal
(Vd > 1.96) or the power-tailed Pareto/Weibull (Vd < −1.96). We find that for
the Coop and Roper Center servers, the Pareto and Weibull distribution offer a
stronger fit to the data compared to the Lognormal. Considering the MLE dis-
tribution fits in Figures 4.1a and 4.1b, however, we see that this result may not
be because the data tends to be power-tailed, but because the Lognormal distri-
bution is a very poor fit to the data. On the SoE server, the Pareto distribution
fits better than the Lognormal, but the Lognormal fits better than the Weibull
distribution. The test indicates that the Pareto is a statistically better fit to the
distribution compared to the Lognormal, even though the Lognormal fit closely
follows the trend in Figure 4.1c and the Hill estimate (Figure 4.2c) never stabilizes
to a consistent value of α.
To summarize, the three tests were unable to come to an agreement about
whether or not response sizes are power-tailed across every Web server. The
distribution fits and the Vuong test statistic suggest that robot traffic to the Coop
Web server may have power-tailed response sizes, however the Hill plot cannot find
a stable estimate of α until almost one third of all the points in the distribution
are eliminated. Furthermore, Vuong’s test suggest power-tailed response sizes
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on the SoE Web server, despite an inadequate Pareto fit and unstable Hill plot.
From this evidence, we cannot conclude that the response sizes of robot traffic is
power-tailed.
We hypothesize that the reason robot traffic is not power-tailed is because
the the aggregate response size distribution for Web robots may be unrelated to
the distribution of resource sizes on a Web server, which is a direct reason for the
emergence of power-tailed response sizes for human traffic [27]. This is supported
by the following reasoning given by Crovella et al.: if all client-side caches used
by Web browsers were considered as a collection, and that clients do not typically
send requests for resources outside of their individual cache, then the combined
resources stored in all client-side caches approximate all of the resources available
on the Web server [27]. Assuming that all clients have a sufficiently large cache
that is seldom emptied, the distribution of the sizes of all responses sent should
approach the distribution of resources available on the server as more and more
clients are considered. This is intuitive, since if a resource that was previously
requested resides in the cache, the browser appends the If-Modified-Since header
to the http packet, telling the server not to respond with the content if the file
has not been modified since a certain time.
A similar argument may not hold for Web robots since it is not assured that
all robots maintain a client-side cache of the requested resources. Furthermore,
it is possible that different types of robots request different types of resources on
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Fig. 4.4: Inter-arrival times: distribution fits
a site exclusively. For example, a search engine robot that seeks only academic
papers may crawl a site and only send requests for document type resources, such
as pdf, ps, and doc files. An e-mail harvester robot, on the other hand, may
send requests for all types of resources except multimedia files to extract e-mail
addresses.
4.3.2 Inter-arrival times
Inter-arrival times correspond to the time between requests originating from the
same Web robot. These times were computed from the server logs by finding
successive requests with identical user-agent fields and sender’s IP addresses. The
distributions of inter-arrival times plotted in Figure 4.4 all have linear bodies with
tails that suddenly drop off at a position that corresponds to the length of the log
analyzed. The limited length of the log truncates the inter-arrival times to never
extend beyond seven weeks. We note, however, that this truncation phenomenon
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Fig. 4.5: Inter-arrival times: Hill estimates
would occur regardless of the length of the log considered in the analysis. This
truncation causes points to accumulate in the far right tail, where all of the data
points that are longer than 48 days in reality are measured as such. The best-
fitting Lognormal distributions do not closely match the robot inter-arrival times
on any server. Furthermore, the estimate of α for the Pareto fits across each server
is inaccurate, but this may be be caused by the concentration of points due to the
data truncation. It is thus difficult to assess the quality of the Pareto fits for this
distribution or to perform any other kind of visual assessment of the fit.
Despite the inconclusive distribution fits, can still rely on the Hill estimator
and Vuong statistic to evaluate power-tailed behavior in truncated data sets. The
Hill plot is effective with truncated data because the influence that the concentra-
tion of data at the right tail becomes mitigated as k increases. Vuong’s test is also
effective because the largest values in the data where points accumulate become
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Fig. 4.6: Inter-arrival times: Vuong statistics
excluded. The Hill estimators for inter-arrival times are plotted in Figure 4.5. For
the Coop Web server, the estimator stabilizes quickly to approximately α = 0.9.
The estimator for the Roper center stabilizes briefly before a sudden linear incline.
This means that the distribution in Figure 4.4b has a power-tailed, linear shape
only briefly near its truncated tail. The Hill plot for the SoE server is less stable
than the plot for the Coop server, and features wide 95% confidence intervals. The
wide confidence intervals can be accounted for by the small perturbations in the
linear trend that run through the body of the distribution in Figure 4.4c. Across
all three Web servers, The Vuong statistics plotted in Figure 4.6 very strongly
reject the Lognormal fits for the power-tailed Weibull and Pareto fits across all of
the servers. Given that the Hill plots are stable at least for a certain period, and
that Vuong’s statistic rejects the Lognormal strongly in favor of the Pareto and
Weibull, we conclude that robot inter-arrival times exhibit power-tailed behavior.
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Fig. 4.7: Session request volume: distribution fits
4.3.3 Session request volume
Next, we examine the number of requests that were sent per session by Web robots.
Figure 4.7 presents this distribution across the three Web servers. The Roper
Center exhibits a linear trend up until approximately 500 requests, where the
slope suddenly changes and quickly drops. The Coop and SoE distributions show
similar behavior, but the change in slope beyond 500 requests is more pronounced.
Neither the Lognormal, Weibull, or Pareto distributions provide adequate fits to
the data. Similar to the response size distributions, however, the poor Pareto fits
may be influenced by the largest values in the extreme right tail.
Figure 4.8 Gives the Hill estimates for the three servers. The estimate for
the Coop Web server fluctuates over a small range (between α = 0.55 and 0.7),
but has a wide confidence interval. The Hill estimate for the Roper Center varies
over a much wider range of values, and becomes distorted as the number of order
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Fig. 4.8: Session request volume: Hill estimates
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Fig. 4.9: Session request volume: Vuong statistics
statistics considered increases. For the SoE Web server, the hill estimate quickly
stabilizes at approximately α = 0.75, with a tighter confidence interval than the
Coop. These observations hint at the presence of power-tailed behavior on the
Coop and SoE Web servers. The plots of the Vuong statistic for these two servers
in Figure 4.9 further suggest that a power tail is present. However, Vuong’s test
statistic increases as more points from the tail of the distribution are removed,
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suggesting that the body of both distributions tend be better fitted by a Lognormal
distribution than a power-tailed one.
The totality of our observations paint a conflicting, inconclusive picture
about whether the volume of requests per session exhibit a power tail. Neither
the Pareto, Weibull, or Lognormal offer a good visual fit to the dataset, the Hill
estimator finds stability for the Coop and SoE, and the Vuong statistic suggests
that the distributions have a tail that fits well to the Pareto or Weibull but a
body that fits better to a Lognormal distribution. Given that no clear conclusions
can be reached, we do not consider the distribution of the volume of requests per
session to have a power-tail.
An intuitive reason why session request volume may not be power-tailed is
because the number of requests per session is primarily related to the information
sought during a visit to a Web site. While some human visitors send many requests
per session as they continue to browse and collect new information, most visitors
will briefly visit a site to collect specific information and then leave. These human
visitors will all exhibit a similar navigational pattern and send a similar number
of requests as they navigate to the same information before leaving. Furthermore,
human users that make repeated trips for similar information will send even fewer
requests as most resources may be available in their client-side cache. As a result,
the number of requests in a session is likely to be similarly low for most sessions,
but a few will exhibit extremely long sessions that contain many more requests.
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Fig. 4.10: Inter-session times: distribution fits
Web robots may contrast from this human behavior in two respects. First, it
is unlikely that two different robots will traverse the same path and request the
exact same resources per session, because of their diverse behavior and varying
intentions [77]. As a result, the number of requests per session for Web robot
traffic will be more diversified. Secondly, individual Web robots may send a fixed
number of requests per session for all visits and perform the exact same crawl over
and over again while not maintaining any client-side cache.
4.3.4 Inter-session times
Finally, we examine the times between Web robot sessions. These distributions,
shown in Figure 4.10, are artificially truncated like the interarrival time distribu-
tions. Prior to the truncation, we observe a linear trend in the data that has a
consistent slope spanning over five orders of magnitude. This large span with a
steady slope suggests that intersession times are power-tailed, but the truncation
149
15 298 616 934 1288 1677 2066 2455
0.
0
0.
5
1.
0
1.
5
2.
0
2.
5
3.
0
k
a
lp
ha
 (C
I, p
 =0
.95
)
(a) Coop
15 864 1925 3093 4261 5429 6597 7765
0.
0
0.
5
1.
0
1.
5
2.
0
2.
5
k
a
lp
ha
 (C
I, p
 =0
.95
)
(b) Roper Center
15 459 958 1512 2122 2732 3342 3952
0.
0
0.
5
1.
0
1.
5
2.
0
2.
5
3.
0
3.
5
k
a
lp
ha
 (C
I, p
 =0
.95
)
(c) SoE
Fig. 4.11: Inter-session times: Hill estimates
in the data prevents any conclusions from being drawn.
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Fig. 4.12: Inter-session times: Vuong statistics
The Hill plots presented in Figure 4.11 provide some evidence that interses-
sion times exhibit power-tails. Across all Web servers, the Hill estimates quickly
converge and remain steady around an α value with tight 95% confidence intervals.
Unlike the Hill estimates for interarrival times, where the plot became distorted
as an increasing amount of the distribution’s left tail was considered, these plots
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do not diverge away from the value of α it initially settles on. Thus, whereas
interarrival times appear to be power-tailed only beyond a minimum data value,
intersession times exhibit power-tailed behavior starting at the beginning of the
distribution.
The Vuong statistics plotted in Figure 4.12 are in agreement with the Hill
estimates and with the observations made about the shape of the intersession time
distributions. We find that as the truncated tail of the distribution is eliminated,
Vuong’s statistic more strongly accepts the Pareto as being a superior fit versus
the Lognormal distribution. On the Coop and SoE servers, we can even conclude
that the Pareto fits better than the Lognormal without removing any points from
the tail. For the Roper Center Web server, however, it takes the removal of
approximately 1, 250 data points from the truncated tail before the Vuong statistic
passes the threshold to accept the Pareto fit on the Roper Center server.
Given the agreement among our observations in the distribution shape, the
Hill estimator, and Vuong’s statistic, we conclude that intersession times for robot
traffic are power-tailed. Our conclusion is consistent with the observation that the
session-based time series of Web traffic is stationary [46]. If the process was not
stationary, the power-tailed characteristics could have been the result of a moving
average within the time series data.
We summarize the results of our comprehensive study in Table 4.2 where we list
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Feature Server Dist. Fit Hill Plot Vuong Conclusion
Coop Yes No Yes
Response
Size
Roper Center No No Yes
Not
Power-tailed
SoE No No Yes
Coop NC Yes Yes
Interarrival
Times
Roper Center NC Yes Yes Power-tailed
SoE NC Yes Yes
Coop No Yes NC
Session Request
Volume
Roper Center No No No
Not
Power-tailed
SoE No Yes NC
Coop NC Yes Yes
Intersession
Times
Roper Center NC Yes Yes Power-tailed
SoE NC Yes Yes
Table 4.2: Evidence of power-tailed behavior
whether or not the distribution fits, Hill estimate, and Vuong statistic suggests
the presence of power-tailed behavior. We use “NC” in to denote “no conclusion”
when a test’s results were inconclusive. The last column lists our conclusion about
whether or not a traffic characteristic is power-tailed, where we conclude that a
characteristic has a power-tail if across all three servers, no test suggested that
the trend was not power-tailed.
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4.4 Long-Range Dependence
Long Range Dependence (LRD) is a property of time series processes that are
self-similar, that is, where the correlation between measurements increasingly far-
ther away does not appreciably diminish. Because of these very long-range cor-
relations, a plot of the number of events per unit time does not smooth out as
measurements become coarser. LRD, along with heavy- and power-tailed trends,
is among the most important statistical properties of traffic for designing high-
performance Web servers [27,52]. For example, exploiting LRD in Web traffic
has led to the development of performance models for Web servers that are more
accurate compare to queueing analysis [56]. Web servers have also been shown to
be more energy-efficient so long as the incoming traffic demonstrates self-similar
qualities [28].
It is not obvious that robot traffic exhibits LRD simply because human
traffic has this property. This is because although robots send requests at a
constant rate to retrieve many different, possibly unrelated resources, humans
deliberately visit a site to retrieve specific information and will request resources
according to the behavior of a Web browser. This behavioral difference suggests
that robots may sport an arrival process that is fundamentally different from
humans. Therefore, in this this section, we examine the arrival process of Web
robot requests to determine if they also exhibit LRD.
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4.4.1 Measuring long range dependence
Given a stochastic process X = {Xt|t = 1, 2, ...} where each Xt is sampled over the
same time interval, define the m-aggregated time series X(m) = {X(m)t |t = 1, 2, ...}
by summing the values of the original process over non-overlapping consecutive
ranges of size m (m is also referred to as the lag of the time series). Then, X is
m-self-similar with parameter H if
Xt = m
1−HX(m)t
for all t, that is, if the m-aggregated time series is proportional to the original
process at a finer scale. Furthermore, X is long-range dependent if both processes
have the same asymptotic variance and autocorrelation as m→∞. If the process
is LRD, as the lag m→∞ the autocorrelation function will behave as
ρ(m) =
E[(Xt − µ)(Xt+m − µ)]
σ2
∼ cm−α
where µ is the mean value of the process, σ2 is its variance, and 0 < α < 1 .
The impact of this power-law decay can be realized by summing across all the
lag m autocorrelations. When the process is not LRD,
∑∞
m=0 ρ(m) < ∞, thus
beyond some lag m the autocorrelation will drop to zero as future measurements
become independent of the past ones taken from longer than some lag period
ago [24]. When the process is LRD, however, the sum is infinite. This means that
in a LRD process the autocorrelation depends on an infinite number of previous
measurements.
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A statistical approach to determine if a process is LRD is to estimate its
Hurst parameter [24] which is defined as H = (1−α)/2. Because of the restrictions
on α, H must fall between 0.5 and 1 if and only if the process is LRD.
4.4.2 Hurst parameter estimation
Estimating the hurst parameter H from a dataset is difficult. A wide variety
of estimation techniques have been proposed and analyzed, but they have been
shown to give inconsistent results even when they are evaluated using artificially
generated data [24]. Different estimators may be biased for large or small values
of H, and can perform poorly depending on the periodicity, non-stationarity, and
noise of the time series. LRD is unlikely to exist, however, if several estimators
cannot provide a sufficient estimate of H. Thus, a common approach is to employ
a suite of tests and then verify that the estimate of H returned by each are
consistent. The estimators we choose are the R/S plot, the periodogram, wavelet
analysis, and the whittle estimator. These tests were selected because they are
commonly employed together to identify long-range dependence.
R/S Plot
The R/S statistic considers the expected value of the time series rescaled as follows.
For the mth data point in a time series X = {Xi}, define Zm =
∑m
j=1Xj, R(i) =
max(Z1, ...Zm)−min(Z1, ...Zm), and S(i) as standard deviation of the time series
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values X1, ..., Xm. The expected value of the ratio R(m)/S(m) goes to
E[R(m)/S(m)] ∼ cmH
as m → ∞ with c as a constant. When we plot these ratios generated using the
time series X on log-log scale, we will find that they exhibit a linear trend with
slope H. Thus, if X is LRD the slope of this trend should fall between 0.5 and 1.
For robot traffic across each Web server, we generate a plot of the R/S statistic
on log-log scale and then estimate H as the slope of the linear regression curve
fitting the data.
Periodogram
A periodogram is a plot of the spectral density of a time series against frequencies.
The periodogram of a time series is defined by:
I(λ) =
1
2piN
∣∣∣∣∣
N∑
j=1
Xje
ijλ
∣∣∣∣∣
2
where λ is the frequency and i =
√−1. As λ → 0, on a log-log plot of the
periodogram of an LRD time series will show a slinear trend with slope α − 1 =
1 − 2H. Similar to the R/S plot, we fit a linear regression curve and estimate
α− 1 as the slope of the regression curve.
Wavelet Analysis
Wavelet analysis estimates the hurst parameter by taking a discrete wavelet trans-
formation of the time series. For an LRD time series X = {X(t)|t ∈ R}, this
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(a) Coop (b) Roper Center (c) School of Engineering
Fig. 4.13: R/S plots of Web robot request arrivals
transform is given as:
D(j, k) =
∫
R
X(t)ψj,k(t)dt
where ψj,k(t) = 2
−j/2ψ(2kt − k) is a child wavelet obtained by a shifting and
dilation of the prototype wavelet function ψ. By keeping the child wavelet scaling
parameter j fixed, we can rewrite D(j, k) as D(j, k) = 2j(H+1/2)D(0, k). The
expected value of the square of the log of this function is can be written as:
E[logD(j, k)2] = j(2H + 1) + E[logD(0, k)2]
In other words, H can be estimated as the slope of the regression curve for
E[logD(j, k)2] as the scale parameter j is varied.
Whittle estimator
The whittle estimator is a maximum likelihood estimate of the linear trend in the
periodogram that also provides a confidence interval. This estimator requires a
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(a) Coop (b) Roper Center (c) School of Engineering
Fig. 4.14: Periodogram of Web robot request arrivals
model of the underlying process to be specified a priori. This model can be either
a Fractional Gaussian Noise (FGN) process with 1/2 < H < 1 or a fractional
ARIMA(p, d, q) (fARIMA) process with 0 < d < 1/2. The main difference be-
tween the FGN and fARIMA models is that fARIMA assumes that short-range
dependency also exists, but FGN does not. Thus, we used the Whittle estimator
under the FGN model.
4.4.3 LRD analysis
To analyze whether or not robot traffic is LRD, we first plot the R/S statistic
and periodogram of robot requests in Figures 4.13 and 4.14. The dotted lines in
the R/S plots are boundaries that have a slope of 0.5 and 1, respectively. The
plots are in agreement with their estimate of the hurst parameter on the SoE and
Roper Center servers, and there is a small discrepency for the Coop server. In
table 4.3, we additionally include the estimated hurst parameter values using the
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wavelet and the Whittle estimator. For the Whittle estimator, a 95% confidence
interval on the estimate is also included. The wavelet estimator for the Coop
server more closely agrees with the periodogram estimate, and the value of the
Whittle estimator and range of the 95% confidence intervals both agree with the
estimates derived using the other methods. From this analysis, we find that Web
robot traffic exhibits long range depdenence regardless of the domain of the server
and the types of Web applications hosted.
Server R/S Periodogram Wavelet Whittle [95% CI]
Coop 0.65 0.76 0.74 0.73 [0.72,0.73]
Roper 0.59 0.56 0.51 0.53 [0.49,0.57]
SoE 0.96 0.95 0.89 0.99 [0.96,1.04]
Table 4.3: Summary of hurst parameter estimates
4.4.4 LRD generation
Another important question about the arrival process of robot requests is whether
or not the long range dependence of Web robot traffic is generated by the same
mechanisms as it is for all Web traffic. A well-accepted model that explains the
generation of LRD traffic considers streams of Web traffic that alternate between
ON and OFF periods, where the distribution of ON times is governed by the
heavy-tailed response sizes with parameter αon and OFF times are associated
with the heavy-tailed inter-arrival times of requests with parameter αoff [27].
The aggregation of many such streams forms a self-similar fractional Gaussian
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Server αon αoff
Coop 3.88 3.68
Roper Center 2.25 3.33
SoE 2.28 3.69
Table 4.4: Heavy-tail parameters for ON/OFF periods
noise process with Hurst parameter H = (3 − min(αon, αoff ))/2 . Since the
distributions of ON times consistently show a heavier tail (αon < αoff , generally,
LRD in Web traffic is associated with the distribution of response sizes.
The distribution of response sizes for human traffic can be related to the
heavy-tailed distribution of files hosted on a Web server. If we assume that all
Web clients have a sufficiently large cache that is seldom emptied, the distribution
of the sizes of all responses should approach the distribution of resources hosted
on the server as the number of clients considered increases. Web robot traffic,
however, is distinct because each robot may or may not take advantage of a client-
side cache to store resources. Furthermore, robots may be unable to interact with
Web applications the same way that humans do, preventing them from accessing
the same type of information. Thus, it is likely that the LRD in robot traffic could
instead be associated with the OFF time distribution (the inter-arrival times of
requests) and not with the heavy-tailed distribution of the requested resource
sizes.
To examine this further, Table 4.4 lists the values of αon and αoff for robot
traffic for each server. These estimates were obtained using Clauset et al. maxi-
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mum likelihood method [23] across a range of values at which the heavy-tail can
start, choosing α that best fits the empirical data according to the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov goodness-of-fit statistic. Since αon < αoff for the Roper Center and SoE
Web servers, LRD in robot traffic on these servers may be associated with the re-
sponse size distribution. On the Coop server, however, we find that αoff < αon .
In other words, LRD in robot traffic over an e-commerce server may be generated
by the distribution of inter- arrival times.
4.5 Related Research
Many studies have previously explored the characteristics of Web traffic using
similar distributions for heavy- or power-tailed analysis. The Pareto distribution
of response sizes was first observed by Crovella et al. [27] and has since been
supported from probabilistic models by Mitzenmacher [88]. From these studies
came results by Barford et al. and Arlitt et al. suggesting that the distribution
of response sizes also exhibit power tails [13,7]. Campos et al. notes how even
more precise fits can be obtained by using mixtures double Pareto-Lognormal
distributions [55]. The interarrival times of human requests have been found by
Crovella et al. to be power-tailed and characterized by a Weibull distribution [26].
These authors note that the distribution of interarrival times during ON periods
is Weibull, while the OFF periods follow a Pareto distribution. When considering
the interarrival times between all TCP packets across a link (with no ON/OFF
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period differentiation), Downey suggests that the Pareto distribution fits well in
the body but its extreme tail behavior does not follow power-tailed characteris-
tics [39]. Previous work also suggests that the session request volume for all Web
traffic is power-tailed. For example, Goseva-Popstojanova et al. and Menasce et
al. have reported that the number of requests per session is well fitted by a Pareto
distribution with 1.18 ≤ α ≤ 3.94 [47,87].
In the above studies, power-tailed behaviors were observed by considering
a single test, and even by only a visual inspection of distribution fits on log-log
scale. Our work however considered numerous tests together in order to more
accurately evaluate whether or not a power-tailed trend exists. As suggested by
our analysis of truncated data sets and fits that suggested the presence of a power
tail when we could not conclude one exists, running multiple tests for power tail
analysis is essential. Additionally, the above work considered did not consider
Web robot traffic. Instead, robot traffic was filtered out in a preprocessing step,
or was assumed to be sufficiently low in volume so as to not strong impact the
work’s findings. In this paper, we focused exclusively on Web robot traffic and
discovered that many characteristics do not exhibit power-tailed behavior.
4.6 Chapter Summary
This chapter evaluated whether or not Web robot traffic exhibit power-tailed
trends in many of their traffic characteristics and if the arrival process of their
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requests to a Web server exhibits LRD. We used access logs collected from public
Web servers that span three distinct domains and found that response sizes and
session request volume does not exhibit power-tails, while interarrival and inters-
ession times do. Our conclusions are based on a comprehensive analysis that used
multiple tests to identify power-tailed behavior. Non-power-tailed response sizes
and session request volumes may arise because robots may not maintain a client
side cache, may schedule and send requests at a specific rate based on the tasks
that they are programmed to do, target only the resources they are interested
in during a site crawl, and follow widely varying navigational patterns. It is less
surprising to find power-tailed interarrival and intersession times because there
is a deep relationship between power-tailed arrival distributions and long-range
dependence [37], which Web robot traffic exhibits as confirmed by our study.
Chapter 5
Predictive Caching for Web Robot Traffic
Web caches are the primary tool Web servers use to provide low response rates
to client requests [122]. They also help reduce the number of bottlenecks on a
network [2], and are instrumental for building scalable server clusters [93,100,18].
A Web cache is defined as a reserved amount of space reserved in a high level of
a Web server’s memory hierarchy available for the storage of resources. This high
level memory store, which typically corresponds to a Web server’s main memory
or a specialized hardware device, is located closer to its central processing unit and
thus offers faster read access to resources stored within them. Thus, should a client
request a resource that is stored a Web cache, referred to as a cache hit, the server
can service the request at a faster rate than if the resource was located outside
of the cache (a cache miss). The performance of a cache is measured in terms
of its hit ratio, which is defined as the proportion of requests that are made for
resources stored in the cache [99]. High performance caches are desirable because
cache misses increase the latency of a request and requires the server to perform
costly I/O operations can gradually reduces the reliability of the server [84].
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Ideally, a Web server would be able to store every resource that may be
request by a client into its Web cache, however, hardware and cost barriers limit
the amount of space in higher levels of a system’s memory hierarchy. For exam-
ple, pricing reports researched in 2014 finds the cost of main memory storage for
a Web server to be approximately $9,000 per TB1, versus just $51 per TB for
hard disk storage2. Further constraints in the hardware architecture of a Web
server limits the maximum amount of main memory to be supported, most of
which must be reserved for running the Web server software and many of its
supporting applications. Faced with the reality that one cannot simply build a
cache that can store all resources on a Web server, numerous research studies have
introduced methods designed to optimize the performance of restricted-size Web
caches [1,2,10,13,65,122]. Broadly, these solutions are based on either new hard-
ware and network architectures that improves the throughput of cache accesses
and minimizes the cost of cache misses [102], or on software polices, which are
algorithms that carefully decides what resources should be loaded, evicted, and
admitted into a cache in a way that tries to maximize its hit ratio. Such po-
lices may be defined by heuristic rules [64,71,65,19], or may incorporate predictive
models that anticipate future requests given a past history [92,125,91].
Prevalent Web caching architectures and polices were developed without
considering the possible impact that Web robot traffic, with its differentiated
1http://www.jcmit.com/memoryprice.htm
2http://www.statisticbrain.com/average-cost-of-hard-drive-storage/
165
functionality [33], access patterns [38], and traffic characteristics [32,35], may have
on its performance. Previous studies have noted that a cache’s hit ratio is reduced
by Web robot traffic [4], supporting the notion that the intrinsic differences in their
traffic make their requests incompatible with current Web caches. The effect of
an incompatible cache may be very significant; previous studies find cache hit
ratios to grow only logarithmically with cache size [17]. Thus, a reduction in a
cache’s hit ratio due to robot visits by even just a few percentage points reduces
its performance to a cache with a higher hit ratio but whose size is many times
smaller. To the best of our knowledge, a caching policy designed from the ground-
up for servicing both robot and human traffic with high performance has not yet
been proposed.
Given that robot traffic levels on the Internet have reached new heights
and now account for over half of all HTTP requests submitted globally3, caches
that can support robot requests have never been more essential. This chapter
proposes the design of such a cache, featuring a dual-caching architecture where
requests submitted by robots or humans are serviced using separate caches. The
caching policy for the robot cache uses an Elman neural network to predict the
type of the next request following a sequence of previous request types. Based on
this prediction, we load the Web robot cache with the most popular resources of
the type predicted. We compare the predictive performance of an Elman neural
3http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-25346235
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network against a number of other multinomial predictors and confirm that it
offers strong predictive power. We evaluate our Web robot caching policy against
a suite of baseline polices that encapsulates the traffic features that most polices
used in practice are based on. Experimental results show that our robot caching
policy outperforms the best baseline method by over 33% on a conservatively
sized 40MB cache. Our policy’s performance outstrips the baseline methods even
further as the size of the Web cache increases.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.1 describes the dual-caching
architecture of our system. Section 5.2 explains our caching policy and how we
predict resource types. Section 5.3 evaluates the performance of our caching al-
gorithm against the baseline suite using streams of Web robot requests from the
UConn SoE Web server. We summarize and conclude the chapter in Section 5.4.
5.1 Caching Architecture
The primary reason prevalent caching systems cannot service robot and human
traffic with high performance may be because they route requests from both classes
to a single, common cache. Robot and human traffic, however represent two very
different profiles of traffic. Polices designed around the features of human traffic
should thus not be expected to adequately service robot requests, and vice versa.
Furthermore, there is a danger that a caching policy designed according to the
characteristics of an unfiltered stream of requests that contains a (now realistic)
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equal mix of robot and human traffic will fit itself to trends and behaviors of their
interleaved request stream that does not reflect the patterns of either class. Such
a cache would not perform well when servicing either robots or humans.
Because the traffic profiles of robots and humans are so different, it is intu-
itive that we should handle their requests separately by routing traffic from each
class to a separate cache. This way, we can use a caching policy known to be
compatible with human traffic [21,65] for one cache, and define a new policy that
governs the behavior of a separate cache for robot requests. Figure 5.1 shows how,
by using our method for offline and real-time detection [34] as described in Chap-
ter 2, such a dual-cache architecture can be achieved. The offline detector will
separate past requests made and recorded from the Web server’s access log. The
separated traffic can then be analyzed to learn the features of robot and human
traffic separately. These features can then be applied to the development of the
caching polices for the robot and human Web caches. The real-time detector will
be responsible for routing a request to either the robot or human cache. In light
of the many analyses that compare the relative merits of various caching polices
over human requests [12,122,2], for the remainder of this study, we concentrate
on the development and evaluation of a policy for the Web robot cache.
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Fig. 5.1: Dual-cache architecture for robot and human requests
5.2 Caching Policy for Web Robots
Advanced caching polices exploit characteristics of Web traffic which are modu-
lated by the way humans interact with a Web site. For example, the Web browser
or device a human uses to submit requests will typically follow a request for an
html file with a series of requests for the embedded resources on the page. This
has led to the development of link-distance caching polices, which assume that the
fewer links one resource is from the another recently requested, the more likely it
is that it will be requested in the future and thus should be loaded into the Web
cache [114]. Other polices assert that more recent accesses to a resource suggest
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that it will be requested again in the future [64,89,71]. For Web servers that host
Websites that most humans always enter through a home page, or those that host
time-sensitive content such as news articles, status reports, or information about
an event, such least-recently-used caching polices may perform well.
Web robots, however, are able to crawl a Web site in an unregulated fash-
ion and request resources in any order, irrespective of the site’s link structure.
Furthermore, depending on the functionality of a robot, it may not be interested
in harvesting time-sensitive information. Link-distance and least-recently-used
caching polices are thus two examples of caching polices that depend on behav-
iors intrinsic to human traffic and thus is unlikely to perform well when faced
with robot traffic. Thus, rather than adapting an existing policy tailored to hu-
man traffic, this section introduces a new caching policy that is based on the
patterns of request types within sequences of Web robot requests. first give an
overview of our proposed policy and then explain how our policy can learn and
leverage the request type patterns of Web robot traffic.
5.2.1 Policy overview
Figure 5.2 describes our proposed policy for the Web robot cache. The key in-
gredients of the policy is: (i) predicting the type of the next request that will be
made by a Web robot using a multinomial predictor; (ii) ordering resources of
each type by how frequently they had been requested in the past; and (iii) always
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Fig. 5.2: Robot caching policy based on request type patterns
admitting the most popular resources across all resource types. We explain the
rationale behind these three ingredients below.
Request type patterns
Our analysis of robot traffic in Sections 3.3 and 2.2.1 found that different types of
robots have a penchant for requesting resources only of certain types. For example,
Table 3.5 lists Geniebot as a robot that almost exclusively submits requests for
resources of type web and txt, and Asterias as one that primarily makes web and
av requests. Furthermore, these robot request types also exhibit a pattern within
their ordering. For example, Table 2.3 shows how the MJ12bot only requests web,
txt, and noe resources, and exhibits is a long string of requests for web following
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a single request for txt. We may thus anticipate that, following a request for a txt
or web resource, that the next request will be of type web. As another example,
the table shows how when the robot Y andex is not requesting a web resource,
it submits pairs of requests of the same type. Studying the types of resources
requested and the patterns of these requests within sequences may thus help us
anticipate the next type of resource that will be requested. We thus employ a
multinomial predictor, trained over sequences of past robot request types from
a Web server log file, that computes the probability that the next Web robot
request will be of a certain type. We define these types as the same ones listed
in Table 2.2, along with an unk type for requests made to an unknown type of
resource.
Resource popularity
Numerous studies confirm that the frequency a resource is requested on a Web
server follows a power-tailed distribution [50]. In other words, there exists a small
subset of resources that are requested far more frequently than other resources on
a Web server. This finding serves as the basis for many popularity-based caching
polices [65,19,21] that exhibit high hit ratios. As illustrated in Figure 5.3, which
plots the frequency all resources requested by Web robots between August 1st and
September 17th 2009 from the UConn SoE Web server, we find that the frequency
resources are requested by Web robots also exhibit a power-tail. Owing to the
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success of popularity-based caching in the literature and the power-tailed nature
of resource popularity by Web robots, our policy loads into the Web robot cache
the most frequently requested resources whose type is most likely to be requested
next. If the total size of all resources of a given type is smaller than the size of the
Web robot cache, we load all resources of the predicted type as well as the most
popular resources of the next most likely resource type that will be requested.
Globally popular resources
Before loading the robot cache with the most popular resources of the type pre-
dicted, the policy first admits a small number of resources that are globally popu-
lar, irrespective of their type. This step lets the policy leverages the power-tailed
property of resource popularity, where the most popular resources are requested
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Fig. 5.4: Feature vectors extracted from a stream of robot requests
a disproportionately higher number of times. For example, Figure 5.3 illustrates
how the three most popular resources are requested an order of magnitude more
frequently than the fourth most popular resource. Furthermore, the ten most
popular resources are collectively requested 12.9% of the time. By reserving a
small portion of the robot cache just for these hyper-popular resources, our policy
thus guarantees cache hits for a substantial proportion of requests.
5.2.2 Learning request type patterns
For the purpose of building a training data set for the multinomial predictor, we
define a request type sequence as an ordered sequence of the types of n consecutive
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requests (x1, ...xn) made during a Web robot session. A record of the training
set ri = (vi, li) is given by the feature vector vi = (x1, ...xn−1) and class label
li = xn. Thus, the multinomial predictor will identify patterns within the first
n−1 requests and associate them with the type of the nth request during training.
The extraction of request type sequences from Web robot sessions is illustrated
further in Figure 5.4. In the figure, sequences of size n = 10 are extracted from
a stream of robot requests. From a 12 requests in the stream, 3 training records
can be constructed. The feature vector of the first record is composed of the first
nine and its class label is given by the tenth request; the feature vector of the
second record has the second through tenth request and its class label is given by
the eleventh request; and the third record has a feature vector given by the third
through eleventh request and its class label is the type of the twelfth request.
Once trained, the predictor will maintain a a history of the types of the last
n− 1 requests submitted by a Web robot to the server and, based on this history,
generate the probability distribution for the next type of request that will be
made. Next, we discuss the selection and training of our multinomial predictor.
Prediction model
A number of machine learning models for multinomial prediction, such logistic re-
gression ensembles [49], multinomial naive bayesian networks [72], support vector
machines [111], random forests [29], or feed-forward neural networks [58], may be
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capable of predicting request types.
As mentioned in our discussion from Section 5.2.1, we recall that both fea-
tures of a request sequence as well as the order of types both carry important
information that may be useful for predicting the type of the subsequent request.
For example, consider the two request sequences (web, web, img, img, web) and
(web, img, web, img, web). On the one hand, both sequences exhibit similar fea-
tures, namely, that they are composed of 3 web and 2 img requests. These features
may imply that the next request will be either for a web or img resource. But by
incorporating order within the sequences as well, we may predict that the type of
the next request will be web in the first pattern, and img in the second.
The multinomial predictor for our problem should thus be capable of finding
associations between not only the content, but also between the order of content
and the class labels of feature vectors. A particularly suitable model then is an
Elman Neural Network (ENN) [42]. An ENN, as seen in the top of Figure 5.5,
is a feed-forward neural network with a single hidden layer (blue). Each hidden
unit corresponds to a logistic function whose parameters are fitted so that the
function can identify the presence of an implicit pattern or characteristic in the
input data. For example, the training phase may fit the parameters of a hidden
unit layer to ‘activate’, that is, return a value close to 1, when a request sequence
contains only web or img requests. Another, separate hidden unit may activate if
unk requests are dominant in the sequence.
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Importantly, an ENN is augmented with an additional context layer (the red
units in Figure 5.5) that, during the training phase, stores the output of hidden
layer nodes that are activated during the training process. These values are fed
back into the same hidden layer node during training of the subsequent request.
This recurrence effectively tunes a hidden unit’s parameters to not only the fea-
tures of a training record, but also to the ordering of requests in previous feature
vectors. To conceptualize this, consider the diagram of an ENN with three hidden
states in Figure 5.5. During training on record i, the hidden units use i’s feature
vector to emit a value based on their present parameters, which are routed to the
output units as well as to a context unit. The hidden unit parameters are then
adjusted according to the error between the networks prediction and the actual
label of feature vector i. When the network begins its learning process for training
sample i+1 in the center diagram, the hidden nodes now emit a value based on the
feature vector vi+1 of training record ri+1 as well as its previous activation value
from training sample i. Since this previous activation value represents a hidden
unit’s computation from when an img type in the first position of feature vector
vi, a doc in the second position of vi, and so forth, the hidden node’s new value
will consider the state of previous request sequences as well as the feature vector
of ri+1. Similarly, when the ENN begins training over record ri+2 in the bottom
diagram of Figure 5.5, the context layer incorporates the state of the hidden units
from when the previous two training vectors were analyzed.
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5.2.3 Model evaluation
We evaluated how well an ENN can predict the type of a robot request using a
sample of all Web robot requests to the UConn SoE Web server between August
1st and September 17th 2009. Our offline detection algorithm was used to ex-
tract a total of 487,972 robot requests during this time period. We ordered these
requests by the time they were submitted, and grouped them into robot sessions
with a 30 minute timeout. From each session, we extracted all requests sequences
of length k = 11. Our choice of k was based on our robot detection study, which
found that sequences k ≥ 10 request types was sufficiently long to identify if it
was generated by a robot or a human [34]. After filtering all robot sessions of
length less than 11, we collected 362,390 sequences of robot type requests.
ENN network size
Importantly, the number of hidden units that should be used in an ENN must
be specified a priori. This hyper-parameter needs to be carefully selected; large
numbers of hidden units lets the model make predictions using more features of re-
quest sequences, but require a huge amount of computational power to train [124]
and increases the risk of overfitting the training data. To find the best number of
hidden units for our model, we took sequences of requests made during the first
four and a half weeks (approximately 60% of our sample) and trained a variety
of ENNs sporting between 2 and 40 hidden units. Figure 5.6 reports the mean
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training and validation of these ENNs derived using 10-fold cross-validation. The
model’s accuracy over both training and validation data does not improve appre-
ciably beyond n = 10 hidden layer units. Furthermore, for n > 10, the ENN
shows symptoms of overfitting the training data as its accuracy over the training
folds rise above the validation fold. Thus, we find an ENN with 10 hidden units
to be suitable for our prediction task.
Prediction evaluation
We used the ENN model trained from the first four and a half weeks to predict the
type of the request following the request type sequences in the remaining three
weeks (approximately 40% of the sample). We compared its accuracy against
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two baseline models using the same training data, namely multinomial logistic
regression (MLR) and a first-order discrete time Markov chain (DTMC). The
MLR model consists of an ensemble of binary logistic regression classifiers, each
of which is trained to emit the probability that the class label of a feature vector
is of a specific resource type. Thus, the number of classifiers in the model is
equal to the number of possible classes (resource types). For prediction, MLR
runs all classifiers with the same data, identifies the one that returns the highest
probability, and returns the request type it corresponds to. The DTMC model
computes pi,j, defined as the proportion of time a type j request follows a type
i request, for all resource types i and j in the training data. It subsequently
predicts that the next request will be of type jˆ(i), where i is the type of the last
request made, as jˆ(i) = arg maxj pi,j. We selected these two baselines because
they each correspond to one of the two important qualities of the sequences that
we based our choice of an ENN on: MLR predicts according to only the features
of sequences, while the DTMC just considers the order of request types. We can
thus justify the use of an ENN, which combines both of these features in a single
model, if its accuracy is stronger than these baselines.
Table 5.1 lists the accuracy of these three predictors. The left column gives
the absolute accuracy, while the Gain-RG column lists the percent improvement
of the method compared making a random guess of the next request type, which
we assume to be equal to 1/m where m = 11 is the number resource type classes.
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Model Accuracy Gain-RG Gain-MLR Gain-DTMC
Random Guess 0.091 - - -
MLR 0.338 70.41% - -
DTMC 0.392 74.49% 16.0% -
ENN 0.647 84.54% 47.8% 39.4%
Table 5.1: Accuracy of different request type predictors
Gain-MLR, Gain-DTMC, and Gain-ENN lists the percent improvement in using
a method compared to MLR, DTMC, and ENN, respectively. The Gain-RG of
both MLR and DTMC is over 70%, suggesting that both the features of a request
sequence as well as sequence order are similarly important for predicting request
types. However, request order may be a better tell of the type of the next request
compared to a sequence’s features, since the DMTC model is 16% more accurate
than MLR. ENN combines sequence features and order into a single model to
achieve an even higher Gain-RG of 84.54% and sports a classification accuracy
0.647. This combining gives the ENN much stronger performance compared to
the MLR (47.8% more accurate) and DTMC (39.4% more accurate) models.
5.3 Caching Policy Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the performance of our ENN caching policy for Web
robot requests. We use the same stream of robot requests used to evaluate the
performance of the ENN predictor to simulate the operation of a cache with sizes
that varies between 1MB and 40MB. We selected a number of other caching polices
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to compare the hit ratio of the ENN predictor against. These polices are each
rooted in identifying the a basic property of Web traffic that the majority of the
most popular polices used in practice are based on [12,2]. The other polices are:
• Least-Recently-Used (LRU): This policy always keeps the resources
most recently requested in the cache. If a request arrives for a resource
not in the cache, the policy evicts the resource least recently used and re-
places it with the resource requested.
• Log-size: This policy first loads the cache with the most recently used
resources. On a cache miss, the policy always chooses to evict the resource
with the largest size. Ties are broken by comparing the floor of the log of
the resource sizes. If the resource requested on a cache miss is larger than
any resource in the cache, it does not get admitted.
• Popularity: This policy loads the cache with the most frequently requested
resources. Following every request, the policy checks if a resource has become
more popular than the least popular cached resource. If so, that resource is
replaced.
• Hyper-G [1]: Hyper-G is a hybrid caching policy that considers both the
time since last access and popularity of a resource. On a cache miss, the
policy evicts the resource that has been requested the fewest number of
times in the cache. LRU is used to decide between resources that have been
requested the same number of times.
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Model 1MB 2MB 3MB 4MB 5MB 8MB 12MB 20MB 40MB
Lg-size 0.055 0.056 0.057 0.057 0.057 0.058 0.058 0.059 0.059
LRU 0.111 0.126 0.136 0.141 0.145 0.153 0.159 0.165 0.175
Hyp-G 0.174 0.178 0.172 0.180 0.176 0.188 0.189 0.212 0.236
Pop 0.192 0.204 0.206 0.205 0.205 0.205 0.223 0.224 0.282
ENN 0.185 0.199 0.212 0.220 0.228 0.258 0.284 0.335 0.425
% Gain -3.4% -2.5% 3.78% 6.82% 10.1% 20.5% 21.5% 33.1% 33.6%
Table 5.2: Hit ratio of ENN-based cache policy compared to baselines
Table 5.2 list the hit ratio of each policy under caches of different sizes.
Except for very small cache sizes (2MB or less), the ENN based caching policy
outperforms all of the baseline methods, with an improvement in hit ratio that
grows from just 0.005 for a 3MB cache up over 0.143 using a 40MB cache. Recall-
ing that hit ratios only grow logarithmically with cache size, our policy for caching
robot requests thus offers the same performance as using an exponentially larger
cache paired with the best baseline method. The table also lists the percent im-
provement in hit ratio for our ENN policy against the highest performing policy
among the others, showing how the larger the size of the cache available for robot
requests, the greater the improvement offered by our ENN policy.
We verified that the ENN policy consistently outperforms the others over
different streams of robot requests by comparing policy hit ratios across 100 non-
overlapping partitions of the test set. These partitions were created by dividing
the test data into equally sized groups of contiguous requests. Figure 5.7 plots
the trend of the hit ratio across these polices under different robot cache sizes.
When the cache is 2MB or smaller in size, Hyper-G occasionally outperforms the
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Fig. 5.7: Cache hit ratios over different sized caches
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Popularity and ENN polices. Once we set the cache size to 4MB, however, the hit
ratio of ENN begins differentiate itself as being higher for both Popularity and
Hyper-G across almost every test set. This difference in hit ratio continues to
grow higher as we increase the size of the Web cache.
5.4 Chapter Summary
This chapter presented the design of a novel dual-caching architecture and Web
robot caching policy that can service requests with high performance. The key
components of our architecture include the offline and real-time Web robot de-
tectors described in Chapter 2 and an Elman neural network that can predict the
next type of resource that will be requested given the history of previous request
types. We experimentally verified that the ENN offers more predictive power than
other multinomial predictors by considering both the features of and order of re-
quests within a sequence. We compared the hit ratios attained by our ENN-based
robot caching policy against a number of typically used polices. Except for very
small cache sizes, our ENN-based cache gives the highest hit ratio. ENN yields
progressively better percent gains over the best other policy (Popularity) as the
size of the robot cache increases.
Chapter 6
Concluding Remarks and Future Directions
This dissertation presented a comprehensive survey of Web robot detection tech-
niques, presented state-of-the-art methods for identifying their traffic on the In-
ternet, comprehensively examined robot along multiple dimensions, identified es-
sential differences in the statistical patterns of robot and human traffic, and in-
troduced a novel caching architecture and policy that lets a Web server service
robot requests at a much higher level of performance compared to a number of
common caching techniques. The specific contributions of this dissertation are:
• Survey and classification of robot detection methods: Our detection
survey dichotomized robot detection algorithms according to their funda-
mental detection philosophy. We used this classification to critically analyze
and compare the existing work.
• State-of-the-art offline and real-time robot detection: Our detec-
tion approach addresses the key limitations revealed through our analysis
by rooting analytical models by an intrinsic difference between robot and
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human behavior. Experimental results verified that our approach can be
used both offline and in real-time, with very high accuracy and reliability.
• Multi-dimensional classification of Web robots: A novel framework
for classifying Web robots along multiple dimensions was introduced. In the
framework, we divide robot visitors to a Web server by their functionality,
workload characteristics, and preferred types of resources. These orthogonal
dimensions allowed us to aggregate robot requests in ways that revealed new
information about their behaviors.
• Workload analysis of Web robots: This work throughly analyzed the
statistical features of robot requests across a number of Web servers in differ-
ent domains. Through our analysis, we found that impotant traffic features,
namely response sizes and session request volumes, are not power-tailed.
However, the arrival process of robot requests do exhibit long-range depen-
dence, similar to the arrival process of human requests.
• New caching systems for improving Web server performance: The
design of a novel dual-caching architecture for servicing Web robot and
human traffic with high performance was introduced. The caching system,
which is built off of the lessons learned in the resource-type classification
of Web robots and relies critically on the offline and real-time detection
algorithms presented, uses an Elman neural network to predict resource
request types.
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Taken together, these contributes enable advanced studies of Web robot
traffic (via offline detection), improves a Web servers ability to react to robot
visits (via real-time detection), advances our understanding about the types of
robots that crawl the Web and how they statistically compare to human traffic,
and presents a method for improving Web server performance faced with ever-
increasing levels of robot traffic.
further advances in our understanding of robot traffic and preparing Web
servers to handle their traffic will be done along a number of future research
directions. Specifically, future work will closely study the performance of our
offline and real-time detector on Web servers across a variety of ways, and will
develop plug-ins for common Web server platforms (IIS, Apache) so that real-
time detection can be utilized in practice. Towards better understanding the
statistical nature of robot traffic on the Web, deeper explorations of the intuitive
arguments presented about why some aspects of robot traffic are not-power tailed
will be done. Similar, more comprehensive investigations behind why long-range
dependence in Web robot arrival processes depend on inter-arrival times across
e-commerce servers, but not in an academic server. Finally, different of feature
engineering appraoches that can improve the predictive power of our Elman neural
network for robot caching will be investigated. This investigation may include the
effect of training on longer request sequences and the addition of features such as
resource sizes, time between requests, and the http response codes to also learn
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over. Future work will also verify that our caching model performs well using
traces of robot data from Web servers that span a number of different domains.
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